



APPLIED POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS REPORT

MOYALE CLUSTER



Cross Border Community Resilience meeting held in Moyale Ethiopia bringing together community members living on the border of Kenya and Somalia

DISCLAIMER

This report was produced at the request of the Cross-Border Community Resilience (CBCR) Activity implemented by Chemonics and ACDI/VOCA through funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The report was prepared independently by the Centre of Excellence International Consult (CEIC). The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the USAID or the United States Government.



FOREWORD

This Applied Political Economy Analysis (APEA), which has been produced within the parameters of the Cross-Border Community Resilience (CBCR) Activity, enables us to understand the context in which the Activity will operate (or thinking politically), and understand how to navigate the risks and take advantage of the opportunities within the context to achieve Activity objectives and results (or working politically).

Essentially, thinking and working politically enables the CBCR Activity and its implementing partners to work in a politically aware manner in the Moyale cluster and the Somali region in Ethiopia. The approach is also instrumental for actors to deliberately use the available information to achieve politically practical results.

To our implementing partners (and many others who might find this APEA useful in their programming), this APEA is availed to you as a tool for mapping both facilitators and disruptors in the implementation of activities, identifying the most controversial issues / topics (within the scope of the project) in decision making and in the implementation of planned activities, and identifying windows of opportunity for the project to have an impact on decision-making and implementation. Furthermore, this APEA is instrumental in highlighting how the CBCR Activity will interact with the socio-economic and political conflicts in the Moyale cluster together with the impending challenges as well as opportunities for conflict-sensitive programming.

Within the context of the CBCR Activity, this APEA offers a practical guide by orienting our programming towards political sensitivity, as we have to walk the talk of ‘thinking and working politically’ as we implement project activities. We should therefore not lose such a foresight that this APEA serves as a constant guide and reminder.

Jebiwot Sumbeiywo, Chief of Party (CoP),

Cross Border Community Resilience Activity (CBCR).

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CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
ACRONYMS	v
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. METHODOLOGY	7
2.1. APEA Approach	7
2.3. Data collection approach/methodology	7
2.4. Data sources and sample size	8
2.5. Participatory Action Learning System (PALS)	8
2.6. Sample size determination	8
2.6.1. KII sample size for Moyale cluster	8
2.6.2. Mapping of key stakeholders involved in the study	10
2.7. Key performance indicators that need benchmark results	12
2.8. Data Analysis Techniques	12
2.8.1. Qualitative Data Analysis	12
2.8.2. Quantitative Data Analysis	12
2.9. Quality Assurance	12
2.10. Ethical Considerations	12
2.11. Risks and Mitigation Plans	13
3. FINDINGS	14
2.12. Socioeconomic and political context of the Moyale cluster	14
3.1.1 Marsabit County	14
3.1.2 The Borana Zone	17
3.1.3 Somali region of Ethiopia (partially in the Moyale and Mandera clusters)	21
2.13. Mapping key actors and institutions	24
3.2.1. Facilitators in the Implementation of Activities	24
3.2.2. Disruptors in the implementation activities	28
3.3. Controversial issues in decision-making and implementation of planned activities	30
3.4. Socio-Economic and Political Conflicts and the CBCR Activity	31
3.4.1 The Moyale Cluster	31
3.4.2 The Somali Region	33
3.5 Gender equality and inclusion across cross-border communities	34
3.6 Inclusion of people with disability and minority groups	35
3.7 Windows Of Opportunity for CBCR Activity Impact on Decision-Making and Implementation	35
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	37
4.1 RECOMMENDATIONS	37
4.2 Recommendations on Addressing Gender Inequality and Social Inclusion	39
4.3.1 Better Ways of Handling Scarce Resource-Based Conflict	39
5. ANNEX	41

ACRONYMS

AU	African Union
CBCR	Cross-Border Community Resilience
CBO	Community-Based Organizations
CDR	Clan Dispute Resolution
CDR	Clan Dispute Resolution
CEIC	Center of Excellence International Consult
CSA	Central Statistics Agency
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DC	Development Credit
DFID	Department For International Development
ECM	Executive Cabinet Member
EU	European Union
FBO	Faith-Based Organizations
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FGD	Focused Group Discussion
FGDs	Focused Group Discussions
GHG	Green House Gas
HoA	Horn of Africa
IGA	Income Generating Schemes
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KIIs	Key Informant Interviews
LAPSET	Lamu Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor Project
MRCA	Member of Regional Council Assembly
MS	Member State
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
OLF	Ogaden Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
PALS	Participatory Action Learning System
PEA	Political Economic Analysis
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Program
RRS	Refugees and Returnees Service
SPD	Somali Democratic Party
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study provides an Applied Political Economy Analysis (APEA) for the Moyale and Mandera clusters that comprise the Kenya-Ethiopia and Ethiopia-Somalia borderlands. The overall goal of the APEA is to support the CBCR Activity in its programming. This includes helping in a) understanding the context in which the Activity will operate (or thinking politically), and b) understanding how to navigate the risks and take advantage of the opportunities within the context to achieve Activity objectives and results (or working politically).

More specifically, the APEA seeks to identify facilitators and disruptors in implementing the CBCR Activity, categorize the most controversial issues within the projects' scope that influence decision-making and implementation of the planned activities, and make opportunities for the Activity to maximize its impact during implementation. Moreover, the potential threats and challenges in implementing the CBCR's activities are analyzed, as well as the opportunity for the project to impact decision-making and implementation.

The study used mainly a qualitative research approach, collecting primary data through key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs). A total of 183 KIIs and 96 FGDs were conducted in the Moyale cluster (the Borana zone in the Oromia region, Ethiopia, and Marsabit County in Kenya), and the Liben and Afder zones in Ethiopia's Somali region (that fall in the Mandera cluster). Fieldwork was conducted from August 24 – October 5, 2022. Moreover, secondary literature from governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were reviewed as additional data sources.

Consequently, the APEA identified several potential facilitators of the CBCR's activities in the Moyale cluster. These include national and regional governments, clan elders, women leaders, and some local and international NGOs. Overall, the national governments in both Ethiopia and Kenya were identified as crucial facilitators due to their roles in allocating resources for development activities, operation of regional/decentralized governments, formulation and implementation of policies, and regulating control security within their borders. Specifically, in Marsabit County, the county government and its decentralized structures emerged as facilitators owing to their authority and access to the region. Clan leaders play a significant role in Moyale's politics, peacemaking, and conflict resolution. The *Ugaas* (Somali clanship leader), the *Abbaa Gadaa* (Oromo traditional democratic leadership system), and the *Haadha Siinqee* (Oromo women in charge of peacekeeping) are also signified as facilitators.

Local and international organizations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Hilfswerk der Evangelischen Kirchen Schweiz (HEKS), Concern Worldwide, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Welthungerhilfe (WHH), Save the Children, and CARITAS (Switzerland) were also considered essential facilitators to the success of the CBCR Activity. Furthermore, there are many chances to work with these organizations in a way that has the most significant effect. Women's and youth networks in the communities, such as women's peace groups, self-help groups, and youth associations (such as *qeerroo/qarree*¹), have also been identified as facilitators.

Similarly, the APEA identified several key stakeholders as facilitators in the Borana zone. These include the regional government of Oromia and its tiers of structures until the lowest levels. This is due to their pivotal roles in decision-making and resource distribution, security maintenance, and creating an environment for successfully implementing the CBCR Activity. The *Ugaas*, the *Abbaa Gadaa*, the *Haadha Siinqee*, and the councils of elders were also identified as central to the Activity's success.

¹ *Qeerroo/Qarree* refers to youth volunteer groups (boys/girls) in traditional Oromo culture representing the contribution of the youth who assume responsibility for the economic, political, and social development of the community.

Through built-in indigenous mechanisms, these stakeholders are particularly involved in conflict resolution that promotes the peaceful coexistence of the cross-border communities, and have control over the politics in the cross-border areas.

Facilitators for the Somali region of Ethiopia include the regional state, zonal, and *woreda* (district) administration structures. They have significant roles in decision-making and resource distribution, maintenance of security, and creating an environment for the successful implementation of the CBCR Activity.

The *Ugaas* and clan leaders are highly involved in conflict resolution and dominate the political dynamics of the Somali region. The federal government of Ethiopia is also a key facilitator, especially in contributing resources (such as finance and human power), formulating and implementing policies/strategies, fighting insurgencies such as the Al-Shabaab and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and overall maintenance of peace and security.

Additionally, savings associations and local and international organizations are crucial to the continued effectiveness of the CBCR Activity because of their complementary roles in the region. As such, there are many opportunities for collaboration with like-minded regional actors.

Conversely, the main disruptors of the CBCR Activity were identified as violent extremist groups such as the Al-Shabaab, secessionist groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front /Army (OLF/OLA) and the ONLF, ethnic and clan-based conflicts, and climate change. In the Moyale cluster, young people and migrants trying to cross the border from Kenya and elsewhere in search of work in the Borana zone, and vice versa, are radicalized by armed militia groups such as the OLA and Al-Shabaab. These radicalized youths ultimately turn against the community and the government, causing fatalities, destruction of property, and disruption of socioeconomic activities. Similarly, the Al-Shabaab and ONLF are creating civil unrest and destroying lives, livelihoods, and properties in the Somali region. These violent groups hide in clannism, which is the most common social organization among the dominant Somali and a driver of disintegration and inter-clan conflicts.

While the OLA, a military wing of the OLF in Ethiopia, is identified as the main disruptor in the Borana zone, the Al-Shabaab's disruptions cut across the Moyale cluster and Ethiopia's Somali region. The Al-Shabaab is expanding into neighboring countries, especially Kenya and Ethiopia, and their terrorist strikes have caused serious hardship for the people and the government, and impacted investments and economic growth. Although Al-Shabaab is a continued threat to Ethiopia's Somali region, its infiltration capacity in the country is lower except for sporadic types of fighting because of the presence of Ethiopian military on the border with Somalia. The CBCR Activity is required to exhibit caution and operate within such understanding.

Additionally, because the Liben and Afder zones are located in the periphery and extremist armed groups are gaining increased profit from their lucrative smuggling businesses, new groups are being created while some are defending their legacy.

Informal business groups (smugglers) portend as potential disruptors in the implementation of the CBCR Activity. Given the porous nature of the borders, these informal actors control cross-border trade routes that compete with the legal trade works, in addition to trading illicit weapons and human trafficking. Further, the CBCR Activity's programming may also be seriously threatened by the prevalence of many unemployed youth throughout the clusters. These disruptors require tactical adjustments in those areas for effective CBCR Activity.

The negative effects of climate change on the pastoralists in the cluster are extremely frequent and sometimes unprecedented. Poor farmers and pastoralists who depend on climate-sensitive livelihoods

and natural resources are at risk due to climate change and variability in the Moyale and Mandera clusters. While governments primarily focus on the phases of recovery and rehabilitation, the top priority must be establishing a preventive approach through the implementation of adaptation and mitigation strategies.

Regarding controversial issues, territorial disputes were identified as persistent and potential conflict triggers across the clusters. First, in the Moyale cluster, Moyale town has experienced prolonged conflict between the Borana and the Garre communities over land rights where the town is founded. The same contestation extends into the Dawa zone in Ethiopia's Somali region, where the zone's ownership by Garre communities is perceived by the Borana to be due to the former's expansionist behavior into their land. Second, in Ethiopia's Somali region, the ONLF claims that Ethiopia is an occupying government, despite Ogaden representation in the Ethiopian federal government by groups such as the Somali People's Democratic Party (SPDP). The Somali region also neighbors Somaliland, which has controversial relationships with Somalia. Partly because of tensions between the two states, there was a recent conflict in Las Anod region of Somaliland that led to the inflow of refugees into Jigjiga.

There are also windows of opportunity that must be tapped for the success of the CBCR Activity in cross-border areas. These include national and local government officials of Ethiopia and Kenya working with all traditional leaders, including the *Abbaa Gadaa*, *Haadha Siinqee*, *Ugaas*, clan elders, and councils of elders. These informal institutions are respected in the communities and can help to promote the Activity's importance and foster an environment that will make its implementation easier. Because of their tremendous influence on the neighborhood and local authorities, clan and councils of elders are key players in the CBCR Activity's implementation.

I/NGOs have ample experience in climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies, and in designing and implementing risk-sensitive programming in the area. If the CBCR Activity can share its accumulated knowledge and expertise through existing NGO platforms, it can operate in the areas without duplicating efforts, and with high synergy.

The APEA study also identified glaring gender inequality and gaps in social inclusion across both clusters. Hence, there is a need to address unequal power relations experienced by people on the grounds of gender, wealth, ability, location, ethnicity, language, and agency, or a combination of these dimensions. Women and people with disabilities (PWDs) are the most marginalized community groups, a fact that is reinforced by cultural and religious norms and values. Youth are the second most marginalized group in the communities, and they are not eligible to make decisions or have control over resources.


Finally, the APEA study stipulated specific recommendations for all issues identified based on the findings. Adhering to the specific recommendations would help the CBCR Activity to better address the gaps and challenges identified in this study. Therefore, collaborating with facilitators, supporting indigenous peace-building initiatives, empowering youth and women economically, enhancing climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies for pastoralist communities, and fostering cross-border community resilience are recommended in the CBCR Activity's future programming.

1. INTRODUCTION

Kenya and Ethiopia share a large porous border spanning a length of 861 kilometers. The border traverses Marsabit, Mandera, Turkana, and Wajir Counties in Kenya, and the Borena, Dawa, and Omo zones in Ethiopia. On the Kenyan side of the borderlands, Marsabit County shares a longer border with Ethiopia, with the Borana zone also sharing a long border with Kenya compared to Dawa and Omo zones². The Somali region of Ethiopia shares a border with Marsabit County and with Dawa zone across the Moyale cluster. These borderlands collectively form the Moyale cross-border cluster.

Nomadic pastoralist communities, including the Borana, Gabbra, and Garre, among others, live on both sides of the border. These communities are primarily pastoralists whose livelihood is mainly based on livestock herding.

Figure 1: Study locations in Ethiopia and Kenya



The Mandera triangle encompasses Mandera County in Kenya, the Gedo region in Somalia, and the Liben, Afder, and Dawa zones in the Somali region of Ethiopia.

Agro-pastoral livelihoods and lifestyles dominate the area. Cross-border trade, particularly in livestock, cereals, electronics, clothes, and consumer items, constitutes a massive economic activity and growth driver. The market chain extends to larger markets in Kenya and Somalia, and the Gulf countries through Somalia ports.

² United Nations Development Programme (2018). *Cross-Border Cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Marsabit-Moyale Cluster*. <https://www.undp.org/kenya/projects/cross-border-cooperation/>.

Like other border regions, Marsabit and Mandera Counties in Kenya, and the Borana, Dawa, Liben, and Afder zones in Ethiopia are relatively under-developed compared to other regions in their respective countries. Moreover, in both clusters, there are frequent shocks, such as the recent locust invasion, floods, or drought³, which contribute to deepening insecurity due to the induced competition over resources.

In the Moyale cluster, tensions are highly exacerbated by the establishment of the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), and its violent extremism has increasingly threatened the cluster. In addition to the extremist group, there are inter-clan tensions over resource scarcity and disputes over natural resource endowments.

Inter-clan and sub-clan tensions over resources and political power have weakened the unity of the communities across the Moyale cluster and the Somali region of Ethiopia in the Mandera cluster. In addition to the recurrent resource scarcity, disputes over political positions, particularly in Mandera County, have added a layer of complexity to these conflict dynamics. Research⁴ on the area's political economy also demonstrates the growing establishment of Al-Shabaab among communities and political positions. Violent extremism, which used to be confined to Somalia has, to a lesser extent, impacted Liben and Afder zones in Ethiopia according to the data obtained from key informants and FGD participants in this study. Ethiopia is dedicated to combating Al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups in Somalia. Kenya's numerous attempts to impose a wall and close the border, however, have been largely in vain as individuals and goods keep crossing the border⁵.

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was established to combat Al-Shabaab and maintain Somalia's peace. The UN Security Council deployed AMISOM forces to maintain security while gradually handing over responsibilities to Somali security forces. Ethiopia has also strengthened border security along the Ethiopia-Somalia border due to the high-security risk in this area⁶. However, the recurrent tensions and the continuous dialogue among the three concerned countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia) have been improving their capacity to propose a uniform response to their common challenges.

In addition to high poverty levels, the clusters are characterized by low infrastructure development and poor education indicators. For example, literacy levels in Kenya's Moyale are at 78 percent, compared to 82 percent nationally⁷. In contrast, there are no accurate figures for literacy rates for the Somali region of Ethiopia, which is expected to be much lower than the national average⁸.

Moreover, resource scarcity has diminished local capacities for resilience. High population mobility, including across borders, however, has been an important resilience factor. Yet, as water and land

³ Elema, S. U. (2018). *Effects of Climate Variability on Water and Pasture Availability in Turbi Division of Marsabit County, Kenya* [Unpublished Master's thesis]. Kenyatta University.

⁴ Buluma, C. G. (2014). *Al-Shabaab: The Threat to Kenya and the Horn of Africa*. U.S. Army War College. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA589056.pdf>.

⁵ Cannon, J. (2016). Terrorists, Geopolitics and Kenya's Proposed Border Wall with Somalia. *Journal of Terrorism Research*, 7 (2), 23 – 37.

⁶ Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2021). *Country of Origin Information Report Ethiopia, February 2021*. <https://www.government.nl/documents/directives/2021/02/04/general-country-of-origin-information-report-ethiopia-february-2021>

⁷ START Network and ACAPS. (2018). *Kenya (Moyale) Displacement from Ethiopia, briefing note – 22 March 2018*(<https://www.acaps.org/>, accessed on 15 April 2023).

⁸ United Nations Children Education Fund (2018). *Situation Analysis of Children and Women: Somali Region*. <https://www.unicef.org/>

availability decreased, this lifestyle has contributed to causing insecurity. The pastoralist communities have increasingly expanded the size of the territory where they graze their cattle, regardless of borders, accentuating pressure on pasture and water. As a result of these dynamics, there were clashes between the Garre and Borana in July 2012 in Moyale, Ethiopia, forcing more than 20,000 people to flee to Kenya⁹. Cattle raiding has also been used with political goals in the area, such as in 2013 and 2014 when raids over the Gabra community led to their displacement and disenfranchisement for the upcoming elections¹⁰.

Despite such tensions, Moyale town in the Borana zone has drawn political attention as a key connector between Ethiopia and Kenya, as it constitutes the major border point between the two countries. The Kenyan and Ethiopian governments have taken important steps to foster development in the area, such as the signature of the Ethiopia-Kenya Special Status agreement in Moyale¹¹, as well as the rehabilitation of the road between Nairobi and Addis Ababa through the border town.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) promotes cross-border policy development in line with the African Union (AU) Convention¹² on Cross-Border Cooperation (also known as the Niamey Convention), held on May 17, 2012. The vision of an integrated Africa led to the adoption of the Convention with the slogan '*from barriers to bridges*'. However, the national governments still seem hesitant to implement cross-border initiatives¹³. Although aiming to enhance cross-border exchanges and peaceful resolutions of border disputes, which are very relevant issues for most AU member states, the Convention was signed by only 17 AU member states, none of which were from the Horn of Africa (HoA)¹⁴. The main projects conducted by governments in the HoA borderlands seem to relate more to national-level economic development opportunities than to the stabilization of borderland communities, with major infrastructure investments such as the Lamu Port Southern Sudan, Ethiopia Transport corridor project (LAPSSET), solar and wind farms, dams and irrigation, road construction, and private sector investment in extractives and agriculture¹⁵.

The Cross-Border Community Resilience (CBCR) Activity is a five-year project funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The activity aims to build resilience and reduce the need for humanitarian support among communities in the cross-border clusters of Karamoja, Moyale, and Mandera. The CBCR Activity focuses on empowering local entities: communities, civil society, private sector, and local development organizations, to chart their pathways for addressing conflict, improving livelihoods, and/or reducing the risks of shocks and stresses. The CBCR Activity also fosters local ownership of development investments by supporting local leadership in work planning, implementation, and monitoring. The overall purpose is to contribute to the resilience of

⁹ British Broadcasting Corporation. (2022). *Ethiopia: 20,000 flee Moyale clashes - Red Cross*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19028609>

¹⁰ UN OCHA (2014). *Cattle-rustling and the politics of business in Kenya*. <https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/cattle-rustling-and-politics-business-kenya>

¹¹ EU Trust Fund (2021). *Collaboration In Cross-Border Areas of The Horn of Africa Region, Case study on the EUTF*

¹² African Union (2012). *Convention on Cross-Border Cooperation (also known as (Niamey Convention) held on 17 May 2012*. https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36416-sl-African_Union_Convention_on_Cross-Border_Cooperation_Niamey_Convention.pdf

¹³ German Foreign Ministry (2023). *Border Governance: Support to the African Union Border Programme (AUBP), Phase 4 (2020 to 2023)*. <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/15759.html>

¹⁴ African Union, *supra* n 13.

¹⁵ African Development Bank (2023). *Multinational, LAPSSET, Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Project*. <https://projectsportal.afdb.org/>

cross-border communities in Moyale and Mandera clusters to reduce their need for humanitarian support. Overall, the project will:

- 1) Strengthen social cohesion as a foundation for resilience programming.
- 2) Expand conflict-sensitive, inclusive livelihoods, and employment opportunities in cross-border areas.
- 3) Improve conflict-sensitive management and the equitable sharing of natural resources in cross-border areas.
- 4) Enhance collaboration and learning across all activities and investments, including cluster stakeholders.

The CBCR Activity commissioned an Applied Political Economy Analysis (APEA) study in the Moyale and Mandera clusters with the objective to design agile projects that address the challenges in the borderlands. The overall goal of the APEA was to help the CBCR understand a) the context in which the Activity will operate (or think politically), and b) how to navigate risks while optimizing opportunities within its operating context to achieve activity objectives.

More specifically, the APEA sought to:

- 1) Identify facilitators and disruptors in the implementation of activities within the scope of the project
- 2) Identify the most controversial issues/topics within the project's scope that influence decision-making and implementation of the planned activities, and
- 3) Identify opportunities for the project to optimize its impact on decision-making and implementation. The APEA also considered how the CBCR Activity could interact with the socio-economic and political conflicts in the border clusters, as well as the challenges and opportunities for conflict-sensitive programming.

For the Moyale cluster, the County Government of Marsabit and its decentralized structures were identified by the APEA as key facilitators in the implementation of the CBCR Activity. This is due to their pivotal roles in decision-making, resource distribution, and security maintenance. Furthermore, the roles of *Ugaas*, *Abbaa Gadaa*, *Haadha Siinqee*, councils of elders, and clan elders were identified as critical to the Activity's success. They are involved in conflict resolution, peace talks, and controlling the politics of elected leaders.

The national government of Kenya was also identified as an important facilitator, given its role in creating a conducive working environment. The national government allocates financial resources, formulates policies, and regulates security threats by deploying national security forces. Furthermore, local, and international organizations were identified as key facilitators of the CBCR Activity's success because of their complementary work. Thus, there are numerous opportunities to collaborate for the maximum possible impact.

In the Borana zone and the Somali region, the regional governments and their administrative tiers to the lowest structures are facilitators. The traditional organizations (such as *Abbaa Gadaas* and *Haadha Siinqees*) councils of elders, clan leaders, *Ugaas*, *Sultans*, and customary courts¹⁶), in particular, are

¹⁶ Customary courts are established to adjudicate disputes based on customary laws or a customary institution given recognition (source: Oromia National Regional States (2021). A Regulation to Implement the Oromia Region Customary Courts, Proclamation No. 240/2021, Regulation No. 10/2021).

involved in conflict resolution and community relations. Unlike in Marsabit County, the traditional institutions in the Borana zone do not have control over the political situation, despite playing important roles in lobbying electors and facilitating election processes, and maintaining peace and stability pre-, during, and, post-election periods.

The national government of Ethiopia was also identified as a key facilitator as it allocates resources, formulates and implements policies, and regulates security by deploying national forces (such as federal police and defense forces) to fight armed groups (such as OLA) in the cluster. The Government of Ethiopia (through its line ministries) may extend direct support during the implementation period of the CBCR Activity.

Local and international NGOs were viewed as key enablers of the CBCR Activity's success. The range of NGOs operating across the cluster includes those that work on pastoral/agro-pastoral livelihoods diversification, drought resilience activities, disaster risk management, climate change adaptations, peace-building, advocacy, and protection activities.

The common disruptors of the CBCR Activity across the two clusters include violent extremist groups, informal cross-border traders, unemployed youth, and the adverse impacts of climate change. Climate change poses dangers to poor farmers and pastoralists who rely on climate-sensitive livelihoods and natural resources daily. At the same time, informal business groups (smugglers) are disruptors as they control cross-border trade routes that compete with the legal trade works, while unemployed youth are likely to be recruited into criminal networks that might undermine the implementation of the CBCR Activity.

Specifically in the Borana zone, the OLA may pose a threat to the CBCR Activity as it radicalizes the youth, who turn against their community, destroying lives and livelihoods, and causing civil unrest in the cluster. Similarly in the Somali region, the ONLF has been attempting to destabilize the peace and security order put in place by the government of Ethiopia to create an independent Islamic state known as Ogaadeenia. On the other hand, Al-Shabaab, another dominant militant group in the region, has a long-term goal of establishing an Islamic state that includes all Somalis in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia.

Additionally, the clusters have several controversial issues that revolve around territorial disputes, and protracted communal grievances that are perennial conflict triggers across the clusters. However, opportunities exist for conflict-sensitive programming and for the CBCR Activity to have an impact. These include collaborating with national and local government officials in Ethiopia and Kenya, and working with all traditional leaders. These traditional leaders include the *Abbaa Gadaa*, *Haadha Siinqee*, *Ugaas*, clan elders, and councils of elders, all of whom are respected in the communities and can help to promote the Activity's importance and foster an environment that will make its implementation easier. Moreover, there is a presence of local and international NGOs with ample experience designing and implementing conflict-sensitive programming across the clusters.

After this introduction, the methodology of the study is presented in the following section. The section includes details on primary and secondary data collection, data analysis, ethical considerations, and how risks were minimized. Following that is the findings section, which focuses on the political economy of the Moyale and Mandera clusters. It begins with the cluster's context before moving on to key actors and institutions, categorized as either facilitators or disruptors of the CBCR Activity, contentious issues in decision-making, and the implications of socioeconomic and political conflicts for the CBCR

Activity, and the windows of opportunity for achieving the Activity's goals. The study then concludes and offers several recommendations to be considered when executing the CBCR Activity based on the reports of the cluster's political economy analysis.

2. METHODOLOGY

This section discusses the Applied Political Economy Analysis (APEA) approach and the methods of data collection and analysis, quality assurance, ethical issues, and risk management during the APEA study.

2.1. APEA Approach

This report adopted USAID's APEA framework¹⁷, which included the following four units of analysis:

Structural factors: These include socio-economic factors that empower or disempower local entities (communities, civil society, private sector, and governments) to chart their pathways in addressing conflict, improve livelihoods, and/or reduce the risks of shocks and stresses that impact communities' resilience.

Rules of the game: These are formal and informal institutions (rules and norms) that shape the quality of governance, and influence actors' behavior and their incentives, relationships, power dynamics, capacity for collective action, and the extent to which public and private actors behave and interact according to rules that are widely known and accepted.

Here and now: Refers to how current events and circumstances influence the objectives and behavior of key actors and agencies and how they respond to opportunities or impediments to change. This could include leadership changes, scandals, or natural disasters.

Dynamics: Includes dynamics and interactions between fundamental factors, rules of the game, and here and now. How do they affect each other, and how do they influence/shape the prospects for change?

2.2. Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (Gesi) Framework

The study also adopted Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI) considerations in its inception, design, and implementation. As such, the APEA identified barriers from a gendered angle, avoided reinforcing exclusionary power relations, identified different opportunities for change, put together a multi-disciplinary APEA team, and reviewed interview protocols, techniques, and staff/consultants for GESI sensitivity. Finally, the research team developed an analysis that is differentiated by sex, ethnicity, and so forth, so that findings and recommendations are GESI-sensitive.

2.3. Data collection approach/methodology

The study widely used qualitative methods to collect data from primary sources. These included in-depth key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs) from August 24 – October 5, 2022.

The field sites were the Borana zone in the Oromia region, Ethiopia, Marsabit County in Kenya (Moyale cluster), and Dawa, Liben, and Afder zones in Ethiopia's Somali region that fall in the Mandera cluster. For further details, see Tables 1 and 2 under the sample size determination section below.

¹⁷ United States Agency for International Development. (2021). *Behaviorally Focused Applied Political Economy Analysis*. USAID. https://usaidmomentum.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/BF-APEA_Guidance-Memo_FINAL_Sec.508-compliant-REVISED-4_27_2021.pdf

The collection of primary data through KIIs and FGDs ensured the inclusion of diverse stakeholders' opinions and expertise, as ultimately presented in this assessment report. As such, the study engaged a range of stakeholders such as government officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), women, youth, the elderly, religious leaders, and other community-based actors. Further, the study's GESI lens enabled the prioritization of the needs, experiences, and perspectives of women, young people, and traditionally marginalized groups in the Moyale and Mandera clusters.

This exploratory approach was further supplemented by document analysis or desk research. Desk review involved reading reports from government and NGOs to clearly understand the study context. This helped the research team to triangulate data and generate more reliable outcomes on the topic under consideration.

2.4. Data sources and sample size

Detailed sample size descriptions on KII and FGD participants are provided under the sample size determination section. In addition, survey data were collected from purposively selected target groups on some key benchmark indicators on women and youth civic engagement, which are shown in the result section separately. Secondary data sources were reviewed from different literature, particularly research on APEA in cross-border communities.

2.5. Participatory Action Learning System (PALS)

During the study process, the researchers used the Participatory Action Learning System (PALS). The researchers deliberately participated in the study by developing a set of practical and available cases in their context, while asking different community groups with different literacy levels a set of questions using semi-structured interview guides.

Throughout the data collection process, the data collectors (facilitators) used participant-led facilitation and listening techniques for people from different backgrounds. PALS has its principles and has benefited the study in exploring the desired level of quality information through respect, inspiration, participation, inclusion, equality, and empowerment for all principles.

2.6. Sample size determination

2.6.1. KII sample size for Moyale cluster

The study employed non-probability sampling (purposive sampling) in selecting the study participants. Participants were selected from clan leaders, women leaders, youth leaders, religious leaders, and government structures (administration, finance and economy, agriculture and livelihoods, women and children offices, education, natural resources, labor, and social affairs).

Engaging influential community leaders has a multifaceted benefit as they are the gatekeepers for any form of developmental activities in their communities. A gatekeeper is anyone who works to allow, refuse, limit, redirect, support, or hinder initiatives in a community. Community gatekeepers are critical to building and strengthening cooperation and resilience in cross-border communities. Within this process, gatekeepers have a key role in ensuring researchers gain access to potential participants and sites for research. Positive influences of the gatekeepers can be invaluable to the research process by facilitating the smooth running of the research activity to completion.

Table 1: Number of KIIs disaggregated by sex and location.

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWEES				
No	WOREDA	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
BORANA ZONE, OROMIA REGION (ETHIOPIA)				
1	Miyo	8	8	16
2	Moyale	8	8	16
3	Dire	8	8	16
4	Zonal	8	8	16
	Total	32	32	64
MARSABIT COUNTY (KENYA)				
No	Sub - County	Male	Female	Total
1	Moyale	2	2	4
2	Sololo	4	4	8
3	Forolle	4	4	8
4	Dukana	4	4	8
5	Marsabe town	1	1	2
	Total	15	15	30
	Grand Total	47	47	94

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWEES

No	WOREDA	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
DISTRICTS FROM DAWA, LIBEN, AND AFDER ZONE, SOMALI REGION (ETHIOPIA)				
1	Filtu	8	8	16
2	Dollo Ado	8	8	16
3	Kersa Dula	8	8	16
4	Moyale	8	8	16
5	Dolobay	8	8	16
6	Zonal	4	4	8
	Total	44	44	88

Table 2: KII Table for the Mandera cluster (Somali region of Ethiopia) by sex

2.6.2. Mapping of key stakeholders involved in the study

Proper contextual analysis and mapping of key stakeholders were key to understanding the issues on the ground across the cross-border areas. This has contributed to carefully mapping the existing international, national, and local structures on the ground to build resilience and ensure the effectiveness of development activities, leading to improved organizational and development outcomes. Hence, the following groups of stakeholders were engaged in FGD discussions.

Table 3: FGD participants by stakeholders and by cluster

FGD DISCUSSANTS					
No	WOREDA	MALE GROUP (CLAN LEADERS, RELIGIOUS LEADERS, GOVERNMENT LEADERS)	WOMEN GROUPS	YOUTH GROUP ADULT BOYS AND GIRLS	TOTAL
BORANA ZONE, OROMIA REGION (ETHIOPIA)					
1	Miyo	4 FGD	3 FGD	2 FGD	9 FGD
2	Moyale	4 FGD	3 FGD	2 FGD	9FGD
3	Dirre	4 FGD	3 FGD	2 FGD	9FGD
	Total	12 FGD	9 FGD	6 FGD	27 FGD
MARSABIT COUNTY (KENYAN)					
1	Moyale-Kenya	2FGD	2FGD	2 FGD	6 FGD
2	Sololo	2 FGD	2 FGD	2 FGD	6FGD
3	Forolle	2 FGD	2 FGD	2 FGD	6 FGD
4	Dukana	2FG D	2 FGD	2 FGD	6 FGD

<i>Table 4:</i>	Total	8 FGD	8FGD	8 FGD	24 FGD
<i>Number of FGD</i>	Grand Total	20 FGD	17 FGD	14 FGD	51 FGD
<i>discussants disaggregated by sex</i>					

FGD DISCUSSANTS

No	WOREDA	MALE GROUP (CLAN RELIGIOUS GOVERNMENT LEADERS)	WOMEN GROUPS LEADERS, LEADERS,	YOUTH GROUP ADULT BOYS AND GIRLS	TOTAL
LIBEN ZONE, SOMALI REGION (ETHIOPIA)					
1	Filtu	4 FGD	3 FGD	2 FGD	9FGD
2	Dollo Ado	4 FGD	3 FGD	2 FGD	9FGD
3	Kersa Dula	4 FGD	3 FGD	2 FGD	9FGD
	Total	12 FGD	9 FGD	6 FGD	27 FGD
Dawa Zone, Somali Region (Ethiopia)					
1	Moyale	4 FGD	3 FGD	2 FGD	9 FGD
	Total	4 FGD	3 FGD	2 FGD	9 FGD
Afdar Zone, Somali Region (Ethiopia)					
1	Dolobay	4FGD	3FGD	2FGD	9FGD
	Total	4 FGD	3 FGD	2 FGD	9 FGD

2.7. Key performance indicators that need benchmark results

Although the study is mainly qualitative, some key baseline benchmark indicators were identified by incorporating some questionnaires to those who participated in the qualitative study. This has helped to generate adequate data on the benchmark indicators (see the survey results under the result section).

Workshops: To start with, the inception report (output of the desk review) was presented virtually to the reference groups designated by the CBCR Activity coordination team. The CBCR Activity team then traveled from Nairobi to Addis Ababa for an IGAD meeting where they met the research team, and discussed the assessment and overall preparations for the assignment. During the finalization phase, a second in-house consultation meeting was planned to help validate the main findings.

On February 5, 2023, the data validation workshop was held in Moyale town in Ethiopia. Sixty-eight key informants and FGD participants attended the workshop, provided comments/inputs for the enhancement of the report, and validated the results.

2.8. Data Analysis Techniques

2.8.1. Qualitative Data Analysis

The data gathered through KIIs and FGDs was analyzed through qualitative methods. First, the original data was transcribed as raw data. Second, data was checked and edited, and thematically analyzed. Third, interpretation and analysis were conducted. In the fourth step, the findings of the individual interviews were generalized, and differences and similarities were identified, allowing the development of typologies.

The final step was verification, which checks the validity of interpretations. Overall, the data collected was encoded, categorized, and analyzed to produce the required outputs to support the study objectives.

2.8.2. Quantitative Data Analysis

Data collected through closed-ended survey questionnaires were analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software, and descriptive results were generated. The data was presented using descriptive statistics such as tables and percentages, and can be presented as bar graphs, boxes, and pie charts.

2.9. Quality Assurance

This APEA's quality assurance mechanisms included adequate and very relevant training for data collectors, pre-testing of instruments and procedures, and frequent discussions with the CBCR Activity team (both face-to-face and virtual). It also included the recruitment and use of data collectors who speak local languages and are familiar with the sociocultural settings.

2.10. Ethical Considerations

The respondents were informed about the study's objectives and their consent was obtained before conducting the KIIs and FGDs. Participants were specifically informed that they could refuse to participate in the study or opt-out at any point without consequences. In addition, the research assistants introduced themselves to the participants and obtained informed consent. If a participant refused to

participate in the discussions and interviews, the research assistants thanked him/her and continued with another respondent.

Overall, data collection for this APEA was shaped by research ethics principles such as dedication to not harm; respect for cultural norms, values, identities, opinions, and diversity; gender and social inclusion; ensuring voluntary participation; and participant confidentiality and anonymity.

2.11. Risks and Mitigation Plans

To reduce any potential risks throughout the assessment, the CBCR Activity and research team collaborated with pertinent cross-border governmental institutions. The team also created a backup and alternate plan to guarantee that the APEA process would be completed by the grant agreement's deadline. There were potential conflicts, ethnic tensions that already existed, dysfunctional government systems, and problems with telephone and internet connectivity, particularly in the Somali region.

The research team devised mitigation strategies to reduce any potential risks during the assessment. Native Somali speakers, for example, who are familiar with the situation and active members of the community, were assigned to collect data in the Somali region. Data collectors in some peripheral areas, such as Dolo Ado and Dolobay, faced numerous challenges due to a lack of internet and telephone connectivity, forcing them to travel long distances to access connections to report their daily data collection process to the field coordinators.

In the Somali region of Ethiopia, in the absence of vehicles, motorbikes were rented to reach the respondents in far areas. The next section of this report deals with the results and discussions of the findings of this APEA.

3. FINDINGS

This section presents the findings of the APEA for the Moyale cluster and Ethiopia's Somali region that falls in the Mandera cluster. The section begins with the socioeconomic and political context of the study locations, after which the facilitators and disruptors of the CBCR Activity are mapped.

Overall, findings indicate that the main facilitators of the CBCR Activity are the national governments of Ethiopia and Kenya, local governments, clan elders, traditional structures, and women and youth networks in the communities. Conversely, the main disruptors in the implementation of the CBCR Activity include violent extremist groups such as the Al-Shabaab, secessionist groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front /Army (OLF/OLA) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), ethnic and clan-based conflicts, climate change, informal business groups (smugglers), and unemployed youth across the clusters.

Furthermore, the major controversial/contentious issues in the Moyale cluster are the boundary demarcations between the Borana and Dawa zones, as well as the Garre and Borana claims over Moyale town. The border dispute between the Somali region's Dawa and Liben zones and Oromia's Borana and other ethnically based administration areas is analogous. Even though organizations such as the Somali People's Democratic Party (SPDP) have representatives from the Ogaden in the Ethiopian federal government, the ONLF separatist movement's assertions that Ethiopia is an occupying government remain one of the most contentious topics in Ethiopia's Somali area. Additionally, Somaliland, which has a contentious relationship with Somalia, is a neighbor of the Somali region, hence the region's proximity to instability.

The APEA also revealed manifestations of gender inequality in the study areas where women have less control, access, and decision-making power over the resources, and socioeconomic and political dynamics in the area. The details of the analyses, including implications of socio-economic and political conflicts and windows of opportunity for the CBCR Activity are presented in the upcoming sections.

2.12. Socioeconomic and political context of the Moyale cluster

This section briefly discusses the existing structural factors, rules of the game, current events, and circumstances that are fundamental to understanding the contexts in which the CBCR Activity is implemented.

3.1.1 Marsabit County

Marsabit County is among Kenya's 47 counties that were established after the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution. The county is situated in the very northern part of Kenya, bordering Ethiopia, and covers a surface area of 66,923.1 square kilometers¹⁸. The second largest county in Kenya, Marsabit has a total population of 459,785 people. Of these, 243,548 are males, 216,219 females, and 18 intersex persons¹⁹.

There are 77,495 households, with an average household size of 5.8 persons per household, and a population density of six people per square kilometer²⁰. In addition, Marsabit has four sub-counties,

¹⁸ County Government of Marsabit. (2018). *Marsabit County Integrated Development Plan 2018-2022*. <https://repository.kippira.or.ke/bitstream/handle/123456789/90/2018-2022>.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

namely Moyale, North Horr, Saku, and Laisamis.

The county's 2019/20 financial year (FY) budget was KES 286.8 billion from their equitable share of revenue raised nationally²¹. Additionally, the county's FY 2019/20 supplementary budget was KES 8.373 billion, comprising KES 4.152 billion (49.6 percent) and KES 3.489 billion (41.7 percent) allocation for recurrent and development expenditure, respectively²².

The Marsabit County Government consists of the County Assembly and the Executive. The Assembly exercises the government's representative, legislative, and oversight authority, and the Executive exercises the county government's executive authority. The Executive consists of the Governor and the Deputy Governor, who are elected by the citizens of the county every five years. Members of the County Executive Committee (CEC) are appointed by the Governor, and confirmed by the County Assembly. The Governor's role is to provide leadership, to represent the county, and to approve or reject bills passed by the County Assembly²³.

The County Assembly has three important roles: legislative, financial oversight, and representation of the people. All assembly meetings are presided over by the assembly Speaker. The county public service board appoints a Clerk to serve as the assembly's administrative head. The clerk oversees the daily operations of the assembly²⁴. The County Executive oversees preparing county policies, plans, and budgets for approval by the County Assembly, as well as submitting them to the external regulatory offices of the National Treasury and the Office of the Controller of Budget. The CEC's role in public administration includes managing and coordinating the functions of the county administration and its departments; providing the County Assembly with complete and regular reports on matters pertaining to the county; and performing any other relevant functions delegated to it by the Constitution and/or national legislation.

With decentralization and the subsequent creation of more advantageous and powerful positions, as well as control over significant budget amounts, group supremacy has increased inter-clan conflict. Marsabit County is home to major ethnic groups such as the Borana, Gabbra, Rendille, Garre, Burji, Daasanach, Somali, Sakuye, Turkana, Ameru, Samburu, Konso, Watta, and Elmolo. The Rendille, Gabbra, and Borana are the most populous and settled communities. At the county level, the three communities control resources and power, while the minorities - the Samburu, Watta, Daasanach clan, and other migrants - complain of discrimination in resource and power allocation. Clan supremacy battles also dominate elections and political appointments, as weaker or less popular clans are excluded from critical decision-making platforms²⁵.

In terms of the informal institutions, the Borana and the Gabbra clan leaders are very powerful. During election seasons, politicians approach and use them to mobilize the communities. Politicians who run for office usually give resources to clan leaders to use their spheres of influence in their favor. These traditional leaders have traditional rules, structures, sets of norms and value systems that they use to

²¹ Ibid.

²² County Government of Marsabit. (2022). *County Government of Marsabit Department of Finance and Economic Planning (2020-2022) Report*. The Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis. <http://www.marsabit.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/CFSP-2021-5475845.pdf>.

²³ Chapter 11, Constitution of Kenya, 2010.

²⁴ Republic of Kenya (2017). *Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 110 (Acts No. 24), 2017, Nairobi, 13th July, 2017*.

²⁵ Scott-Villiers, P. (2017). *Small wars in Marsabit County: Devolution and political violence in northern Kenya. Conflict, Security and Development*, 17 (3), 247-264.

reach out to the grassroots and disseminate information about political candidates. A candidate who does not approach the clan leaders usually does not win the election.

For their part, women in Marsabit County are burdened by customary laws, cultural attitudes, and gender roles that are rigid. Women have been unable to actively participate in the area's political and socio-economic spheres, as men majorly dominate such spaces. Men are also responsible for resolving intra- and inter-tribal conflicts and instabilities. The decisions they make are binding as they are based on long-established norms and values, and they have ensured social harmony among communities for generations²⁶.

Though supremacy battles for political and economic control among communities in the cluster date back to the colonial era²⁷, the KIIs indicated that the politically instigated territorial expansion and informal cross-border settlements among cross-border communities, such as the Borana and the Gabbra, have been one of the major causes of conflict in the area²⁸. A female key informant²⁹ also confirmed that clan-based conflicts over the natural resources, such as pasture and water, exacerbated by the adverse impacts of climate change, are common in the area. Other conflict triggers are political differences between the Borana and the Gabbra during Kenyan elections.

In addition, conflict arises from group narratives of difference, increasing resource scarcity, a sense of marginalization (social inequity, exclusion, and victimization) from access to basic infrastructure (adequate roads, schools, health facilities, and markets), and youth unemployment. In the case of group narratives of differences, religious differences³⁰ play a role in the conflicts, though not significant. According to a key informant, most of the conflict between communities is related to natural resources and Kenyan elections. For example, sometimes pastoralists from Dillo, Dirre, and Moyale districts in the Borana zone cross the border into Golbo in Moyale sub-county, Kenya in search of pasture³¹.

Concerning election-related conflicts, political competition in Marsabit County is always tense, especially between the two dominant groups, the Borana and the Gabbra. Both have nearly equal populations, with the former slightly more numerous. Additionally, the *Abbaa Gadaas* of the Borana in Ethiopia exercises considerable power over the politics in Marsabit County by mobilizing the Borana community on the Kenyan side. A telephone discussion with a fieldworker³² for this study revealed that Muhammad Ali, the current Marsabit Governor, was supported by the Borana of Ethiopia and the *Abbaa Gadaa* to defeat his political opponent Francis Chachu Ganya from the Gabbra. Mohammad, who ran on a United Democratic Movement (UDM) ticket, received 38,803 votes out of 115,191 cast against his closest rival, Ganya of KANU, who received 28,279 votes³³.

In the case of spatial marginalization, Marsabit County falls in the periphery of Kenya's wider political economy. The area lacks adequate amenities, including water and power supply, and health facilities

²⁶ Interview with community leader, Moyale sub-county, Kenya, 24 September 202.

²⁷ Malicha, W. (2021). *The Politics of Violence in Marsabit County*. The Elephant. <https://www.theelephant.info/>.

²⁸ Interview with key informant, Moyale sub-county, Kenya, 25 September 2022.

²⁹ Interview with key informant, Marsabit County, 24 September 2022.

³⁰ For example, the Gabbra in Ethiopia are Muslim and those in Kenya are mostly Catholic.

³¹ FGD participants, Marsabit county, Kenya, 26 September 2022

³² A telephone discussion with key informant, 23 April 2023. e

³³ Kenya News Agency. (2021). *Governor Ali re-elected in Marsabit county*. <https://www.kenyanews.go.ke/governor-ali-re-elected-in-marsabit/>

for both animals and humans. An interview conducted in Sololo with a key informant³⁴, for example, highlighted the existing poor access and investment in the agricultural sector (such as the livestock sub-sector), market facilities and spaces, storage facilities (for dairy and meat production, for example), and lack of legally established institutions (such as livestock cooperatives), all of which are causes for instability in the area.

Conflict in the county is also exacerbated by several sociocultural practices among the Borana and the Gabbra, such as cattle rustling and the murder of members of groups considered to be enemies. During droughts and epidemics, in particular, these attacks are conducted as a form of reciprocity to help poor people replenish their animals. Based on such resource-based disputes, people continue to kill each other even to date. Due to the long history of these practices in the region, the cross-border communities are currently unstable³⁵.

The sources of conflicts found in Marsabit County should, therefore, be carefully considered when implementing the CBCR Activity, and a plan should be made to address any obstacles to addressing the conflicts. The interplay of the fundamental factors mentioned above and the rules of the game should be well understood before any programming in the community, as they significantly shape and influence the intended objectives of the CBCR Activity either positively or negatively. Therefore, care must be taken when planning the CBCR Activity to bring about positive change in ways that reduce or prevent conflict. This can be done by developing inclusive development programming for the marginalized, creating equal access to basic infrastructure, reducing tensions, mitigating the effects of climate change, and building bridges between cross-border communities to foster their peaceful coexistence.

In general, all players in the development process in the area (including the CBCR Activity), government actors, non-profit organizations, civil society organizations (CSOs), development partners (such as IGAD and AfDB), and the private sector are advised to be aware of the rules of the game and to seize available opportunities in the county to bring about meaningful and sustainable change.

3.1.2 The Borana Zone

Ethiopia is divided into four administrative levels: regions, zones, *woredas* (districts), and *kebeles* (wards). Overall, the country is divided into 11 regions, each with two city administrations, as well as numerous zones, *woredas*, and neighborhood administrations known as *kebeles*. In addition to the country's nine federal states, there are two federal-level city administrations in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.

The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), 1995, established nine autonomous regional states and two city administrations. However, based on the frequent questions by people in the Southern Nationals, Nationalities, and Peoples Region (SNNR), two more autonomous regional states have been established, and two more are in the process of establishment. The already

³⁴ FGD, Marsabit county, Kenya, 21 September 2022

³⁵ Boru M. G. (2016). *Factors Influencing Conflicts among Pastoralists Communities; A Case of the Borana and Gabbra Communities of the Marsabit County, Kenya* [Unpublished Research Project] University of Nairobi.

Ethiopian Monitor. (2021). *House of Fed Approves Formation of Ethiopia's 11th Regional State*. <https://ethiopianmonitor.com/2021/10/31/house-of-fed-approves-formation-of-ethiopias-11th-regional-state/>.

established regions are known as Sidama Regional State and Southwestern Ethiopian Peoples' Regional State³⁶. Hence, Ethiopia currently has 11 regional states and two autonomous city administrations.

The Borana zone is located in the Oromia region along the Ethiopia-Kenya border. The region shares borders with all regional states, except for Tigray. The most important socioeconomic and livelihood activity is agriculture, followed by pastoral and agro-pastoral activities. The Oromia region's arable land feeds nearly half of the country's population, with maize, teff, barley, and wheat grown in large quantities for export and domestic consumption. Most of the country's industries are located in Oromia³⁷. These include the garment, agro-processing, construction industries, mining, quarrying, tanneries, leather, abattoirs, modern industrial parks, wood and metal works, breweries, and beverage industries.

The socioeconomic and political dynamics in Oromia have far-reaching implications for Ethiopia, as a whole, and even for East Africa. This is because Oromia shares a border with all regional states (except Tigray), and it is the largest region in terms of population and size. It also shares international borders with Kenya and South Sudan. For example, the high intensity of protests in Oromia between 2013 and 2017 expanded to other regions (mainly Amhara region) in 2017, which finally resulted in a change of government in the country³⁸. The armed conflict actors in Oromia (such as the OLA) have had significant political and economic implications for the entire country, primarily for the Amhara region, as well as some implications in Borana (Ethiopia) and Kenya cross-border areas, where an OLA wing operates.

The Ethiopian Statistical Service (ESS) estimated the Oromia region's total population to be 39,980,992, as of July 2022. The male population is 20,032,994 people, while the female population is 19,947,998 people. The region's total area is approximately 284,537.84 square kilometers, with an average population density of 140.5 people per square kilometer³⁹.

The ESS projects the total population of the Borana Zone as 1,402,530 (of which male population accounts for 706,797 and female population of 695,733)⁴⁰. The Borana zone covers a spatial area of 649.74 square kilometers, with a population density of 30.9 persons per kilometer square⁴¹. 503,877 people are living in the zone, male to female ratio is 1:1, and about 23 people are living in 1km²; entirely sparsely populated. This indicates that there is a great difference in settlement between districts. About 89% of the population are living in the rural pastoralist areas of the zone⁴².

36

³⁷ African Development Bank. (2018). *Socioeconomic Assessment: Oromia IAIP and RTC. WSP, Water Resources Development and Environment Consultancy (ETWRDEC)*. https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/oromia_appendix_c11_socio-economic_impact_assessment_report_february_2018.pdf

³⁸ Woldesenbet, E., Gebreluel, G., & Bedasso, B. (2022). *Economic Development and Political Violence in Ethiopia, Global Economic Governance Programme Working Paper*. <https://www.geg.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2022-05/GEG%20WP%20145.pdf>

³⁹ Federal Government of Ethiopia. (2022). *Population size by sex, area and density by region, zone and woreda, Addis Ababa*. <http://www.statsethiopia.gov.et/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Population-of-Weredas-as-of-July-2021.pdf>

⁴⁰ Oromia Regional Government (2022). *Oromia Region, Population Statistics Report 2022*. (https://www.citypopulation.de/en/ethiopia/admin/ET04_ormia/).

⁴¹ Yeneayehu, F. & Tihunie, F. Socioeconomic profile of arid and semi-arid agropastoral region of Borana rangeland Southern, Ethiopia, MOJ Ecology & Environmental Sciences, Volume 5 Issue 3, MedCrave.

⁴² The term Degodia is interchangeably used

The eight largest ethnic groups in the region are the Borana Oromo (50.25 percent), the Garre Somali (30.30 percent), the Burji (9.75 percent), the Amhara (7.42 percent), the Degoodi⁴³ Somali (4.95 percent), the Wolayta (4.82%), and the Silt'e (4.28%)⁴⁴.

In governance, the zonal administration is headed by a president, who appoints the zonal Executive Cabinet Members (ECMs). In turn, the ECMs' appointments are approved by the Zonal Council Assembly. The executive authority of the zonal government is vested in the ECM, comprising the zonal president, the deputy administrator, and the Borana zonal ECM. The Borana zonal administrator is the chief executive of the zonal government and the head of the ECM. The zonal administrator's role is to provide leadership, represent the region, and assent to or dissent from bills passed by the Zonal Council Assembly.

The Zonal Council Assembly represents citizens, exercises the legislative authority of the Borana zone government, and oversees the zonal executive. It comprises only elected members referred to as Members of the Zonal Council Assembly (ZECAs). The elected members represent and are elected by citizens at the zonal and district levels. Nominated members are appointed by the political parties without any inclusion criteria for gender, disability, and other vulnerability characteristics. The Zonal Council Assembly Speaker presides over all assembly sittings. The Assembly administration is headed by a clerk who is appointed by the Assembly, and is responsible for the day-to-day administration of the Assembly.

As in other zones, Borana is divided into *woredas*, namely Dire, Moyale, and Miyo. The zone is further sub-divided into *kebeles* (the lowest administrative structure in Ethiopia). The *woredas* have their administrators and cabinet formed by the *woreda* council assembly like in the zonal administrations, where they execute the day-to-day activities in each district. All development budgets and public service budgets are channeled through these structures. Generally, budget approval flows through the three-tier system until it reaches the ground or the people.

In the Borana zone, leadership roles for women, youth, and people with disabilities in public spheres, (such as peace processes) remain a privilege that must be fought for. Women are still primarily viewed as domestic workers who take care of the home and raise children. They are also unable to acquire skills as a result of the barriers to education that they encounter. This restricts women's aspirations for upward social mobility. One of the main effects of gender discrimination in the area is that women are afraid to aim high and pursue anything audacious.

Generally, the Borana zone has poor infrastructure, except for the Moyale corridor. It is characterized by scarce drinking water for humans and livestock, and malnutrition among children (especially those under five years). It is a relief-dependent zone, highly affected by scarce or erratic rains and high climatic conditions.

The Oromia Regional State Council (*Chaffee*)⁴⁵ has approved a 90-billion birr budget for the 2021/22 Ethiopian fiscal year, and allotted 4 billion for Borana Zone⁴⁶. This budget is intended for administrative purposes, poverty alleviation government programs, basic public infrastructure construction, and achieving the UN sustainable development goals (SDGs).

⁴³ Oromia Regional Government, *supra* n 41

⁴⁴

⁴⁵ Chaffee is the highest regional legislative assembly or council.

⁴⁶ Chaffee Oromia Approved 90 Bn Birr Budget for 2020 Fiscal Year.

The current decentralized regional administration has been fueling conflict in the country. As is the case with federalism, ethnic federalism advocates self-rule, shared rule, regional empowerment, regional autonomy, and unity in diversity. In sharp contrast with a unitary government, federalism is decentralized and has the advantage of accommodating variant local interests⁴⁷. The ethnic-based boundary demarcation between the Borana and the Somali region has resulted in a series of border clashes. For example, in February 2009, clashes between the Borana and the Garre (a Somali clan) killed hundreds of people, and thousands were also displaced⁴⁸.

The ethnic supremacy battle for political and economic control within ethnically based federalism dates to the ratification of Ethiopia's Constitution of 1995⁴⁹. In addition, the establishment of regional demarcation between the Oromia and the Somali region has created several ethnic-based conflicts between the Oromo and Somali in bordering areas⁵⁰. The implementation of the federal government system on ethnonationalism, as demonstrated in Ethiopia, has exacerbated the situation.

Ethnonationalism, the belief that a particular person is distinct and has the right to self-rule in their homeland, has exacerbated community clashes in Ethiopia. The International Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)⁵¹, for example, reported several such ethnic-based conflicts. Clashes were between Borana and the Guji⁵², and between the Borana and the Garre⁵³, and the communities across the international border between northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia. Moreover, increasing resource scarcity, social inequity, exclusion from access to basic infrastructure, socio-cultural factors, presence of violent extremist groups and /or militia groups, and the influx of illegal arms and climatic changes induced conflicts in the Borana zone.

Conflicts between the Oromo (Borana) and the Somali (Garre) usually involve cycles of cattle rustling and theft as they seek to restock or exact revenge for raids and killings in a context of highly variable rains and a mobile lifestyle that sometimes brings different clans into competition over scarce resources. Drought increases violence as people battle to stay alive, as the effects of climate change have exacerbated scarcity issues and increased competitiveness and conflict⁵⁴.

Study participants also expressed worries about some of the detrimental consequences of the establishment of Oromia and Somali Regions' ethnic boundaries. Restrictions on mobility to access land based on political claims are a leading reason for severe dissatisfaction for pastoralists. The establishment of new boreholes or wells in one jurisdiction to benefit one ethnic group / clan, and the perceived disadvantage of another can easily trigger intense and lethal clan or ethnic conflict⁵⁵.

⁴⁷ Taye, B. (2017). *Ethnic federalism and conflict in Ethiopia*. Accord. <https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajcr/article/view/167170/156607>.

⁴⁸ International Displacement Monitoring Center & Norwegian Refugee Council. (2009). *Ethiopia: Human rights violations and conflicts continue to cause displacement: A profile of the internal displacement situation 3 September 2009*. www.internal-displacement.org

⁴⁹ International Crisis Group (2009). *Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents*. Africa Report N°153. <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4aa4c0c82.pdf>

⁵⁰ Kenec, F.B. (2022). Pastoralists and Violent Conflict along the Oromia–Somali Border in Eastern Ethiopia: Institutional Options toward Peacebuilding. *African Studies Review*, 65(2), 404–429. doi:10.1017/asr.2021.89.

⁵¹ International Displacement Monitoring Center and Norwegian Refugee Council, supra n 48.

⁵² Gololcha, B. (2015). *Ethnic Conflict and Its Management in Pastoralist Communities: The Case of Guji and Borana Zones of Oromia National Regional State* [Unpublished M.A Thesis]. University of Addis Ababa.

⁵³ Tigist, K. F. (2014). *Conflicts among Pastoralists in the Borana Area of Southern Ethiopia: The case of Borana and Garri* [Unpublished M.A Thesis]. The Arctic University of Norway.

⁵⁴ Interview with key informant, Moyale town, Ethiopia, 24 September 2022

⁵⁵ Ibid.

For example, the Gabbra and the Borana have been engaging in inter-ethnic clashes, which resulted in the loss of properties and lives. The prevailing inter-clan rivalry has created fear within both the Gabbra and Borana communities, and members of either group are denied free movement in areas where a given group dominantly live. The conflict between the Gabbra and Borana is sometimes exacerbated by fights over scarce water and pasture resources.

Other conflict triggers include cattle rustling, infiltrations of arms/aliens from across Marsabit County and the Borana zones, and inflammatory remarks by local politicians in Ethiopia and Kenya⁵⁶. The FGDs⁵⁷ held in Borana confirm that the ethnic-based conflict between the groups in the area has a connection with the national discourse on ethnicity and local realities, particularly since the coming to power of Ethiopia's People Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF) government in 1990s. Thus, the discussants noted that violent conflicts in pastoral areas are the result of a slew of historical and socioeconomic factors (such as cattle rustling) that reinforce one another. They also argued that pastoralist conflicts, if not all conflicts, are linked to issues of access to natural resources such as land, water points, and pasture.

As discussed earlier, the ethnic-based regional structures in the Oromia region and the deep-rooted ethnonationalism structures are seen as reasons for slow development. They could potentially lead to conflicts with neighboring Somali and other ethnic nationalities in Ethiopia. Furthermore, the ethnic-based administrative structure and the scarcity of vital natural resources, such as water and pasturelands, are key structural factors that could potentially challenge and delay any development programs across borders. The ethnic-based structures can influence the governance systems in some way, and may also impact future CBCR Activity programming in one way or another.

A better understanding of the current ethnic-based boundary demarcations and the situation of natural resources by the CBCR Activity would aid in knowing the facts and proactive planning for context-fit programming that ensures accountability and responsibility for local authorities, while preventing resource misallocation. This will make it easier for the CBCR Activity implementation to capitalize on opportunities and overcome the roadblocks.

The interplay between fundamental factors and rules of the game has an effect, or can influence, the CBCR Activity's programming. Therefore, closely following the trends and adjusting accordingly will potentially minimize risks and increase cooperative dynamics that help the progressive implementation of the CBCR Activity.

3.1.3 Somali region of Ethiopia (partially in the Moyale and Mandera clusters)

The Somali regional state is the country's second-largest region. It shares a border with Afar and the Oromia region and the Dire Dawa city administration to the west, Djibouti to the north, *de facto* Somaliland to the north-east, Somalia from east to south, and Kenya to the south-west⁵⁸. The region is divided into 11 administrative zones, 11 town administrations, and 104 *woredas*. Dawa is one of the zones in the region, bordering the Oromia region to the west, and Kenya to the south at the Moyale cluster. Towns in the Dawa zone include Mubarak, Moyale, Hudhet, Kedaduma, and Lahey. Moyale and other towns in the Dawa zone immediately fall under the Moyale cluster.

⁵⁶ Bayu, supra n 35.

⁵⁷ FGDs with women in Moyale and Mandera clusters held from September 21-26, 2022.

⁵⁸ Federal Government of Ethiopia. (2020). *Ethiopia's political map and Regions*. <https://www.mappr.co/political-maps/ethiopia/>.

The Liben and Afder zones in the Somali region are clustered under the Mandera cluster⁵⁹. Liben (Somali: Liiban) is bordered on the south by Kenya, on the northwest by the Oromia region, on the northeast by the Afder zone, and the southeast by Somalia's federal state of Jubaland. Afder zone is bordered on the southwest by the Ganale Dorya River, which separates it from the Liben zone, on the west by the Oromia Region, on the north by Nogob zone, on the northeast by Shabele zone, and on the south by the Somalia federal states of Hirshabelle, Southwest, and Jubaland.

Based on the July 2022 population projection by the Ethiopian Statistical Service (ESS), the Somali region has a total population of 6,506,002, consisting of 3,455,000 men and 3,051,002 women. Urban inhabitants number 1,301,200 or 20 percent of the population, and a further 5,204,802, or 80 percent, are pastoralists and farmers. With an estimated area of 327,068 square kilometers, this region has an estimated density of 20.9 people per square kilometer. For the entire region 1,685,986 households were counted, which results in an average for the region of 6.8 persons per household, with urban households having on average six persons, and rural households of 6.5 people⁶⁰.

Clanship, more than the residence, is the basis for the socio-political organization and mobilization of the dominant Somali society in the region. *Xeer* is defined as the norms and rules through which clan members are governed. Customary leadership is at the center of Somali clanship. *Ugaas* (clan chieftdom)⁶¹ is predominantly a nominal authority based on genealogical position, perceived wisdom, religious knowledge, seniority or elderliness, and other personal attributes. That said, actual leadership power at the local level, or the lowest clan segmentary lineage, is held by sub-clan elders who have similar sources of authority as the *Ugaas* to interpret and enforce *xeer*⁶².

Inequality against women in the Somali community is more severe than it is among the Borana. It is still necessary to fight for leadership positions for women, young people, and individuals with disabilities in public arenas (such as peace processes). Women are still generally thought of as housewives and mothers who take care of the home. Barriers to education restrict women from acquiring skills. This limits women's aspirations to overcome barriers and subvert social norms. Women are reluctant to aim high and pursue anything adventurous in this field, which is one of the main repercussions of gender discrimination.

Clan elders need the support and trust of their clan members to maintain their status while they, reciprocally, protect the interests of their clan members. Clans are social constructions enacted by people using them for the purpose of identification, making claims, dividing or competing for power (while they are not) the most dominant at all times or absent in Somali society⁶³. Clanship is dynamic and flexible so that at least its characteristics and functions change in accordance with changing political and economic contexts. Somali clanship is constituted by different social groups, based on gender, age, and class, who have different capacities to access and exercise power.

Moreover, clanship is constituted by rules and sanctions of collective management, access and use of rangeland resources, and mutual help with which nomadic pastoralism is supported. All these features of self-management constitute Somali clanship as the relevant site for governmental interventions

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Federal Government of Ethiopia, *supra* n 39.

⁶¹ Interview with key informant, Dolo Ado district, Somalia, September 21, 2022

⁶² Alene, G. D., Duncan, J., & Dijk, H. V. (2023). *Government through clanship: Governing Ethiopia's Somali pastoralists through a community-based social protection programme*. *Critical Social Policy*, 43 (1), 157–177

⁶³ Ibid.

through community-based social development programs. Hence, in the context of Somali society, for community-based social development interventions such as the CBCR Activity to succeed, they need to be framed in terms of features of clanship (values, rules, and leadership) which then ought to be mobilized⁶⁴.

Therefore, for any developmental activity in Somali region, clanship is still the dominant principle of the socio-political organization of Somali society as apparent in the case of our research area. Clanship is relevant because recent interventions in development and governance (for example ‘decentralized’ ethnic federalism) by the Ethiopian state have drawn on the discourse of clanship⁶⁵.

Across the Somali region, based on Ethiopia’s ethnic-based decentralizations, zonal administrations are organized (formed) based on the presence of dominant clans in the area. In the Dawa zone, according to Somali clanship, Garre is the dominant clan, while Garrewa is the minority clan. In the Liben zone, Degodia is the dominant clan, while Mariyan is the minority clan. For Afder zone, Ogaden clan is dominant, and Dir is the minority clan.

All districts, including Kersa Dula, Dollo Ado, Filtu, Moyale, and Dolobay have administrations that are decentralized based on the dominant clan. Districts can be seen as the final lower-level structure where government touches the ground, and all development and public service budgets are channeled through these structures.

The ethnic supremacy battle for political and economic control, and struggle over leadership and political power within ethnic-based federalism dates back to the ratification of the Ethiopian Constitution of 1995⁶⁶. The regional demarcation between the Somali and the Oromia regions has resulted in several ethnic conflicts between communities in the region borderlands⁶⁷.

The ethnic-based regional structures in the Somali region and deep-rooted clannism structures are seen to slow development and could potentially lead to the rise of inter-clan conflicts within the region, and of ethnic conflicts with the neighboring Oromia and Afar regions. Moreover, the endowments of natural resources according to clan or socio-economic class structures are the key structural factors that could potentially challenge and delay any developmental programs across the Somali region of Ethiopia. Therefore, the CBCR Activity’s programming must capture this reality while planning and implementing its programs.

Future CBCR Activity programming must align with the real context in line with the rules of the game (both the political and informal clan games). Additionally, a better grasp of the current situation by the CBCR team would aid in knowing the facts for proactive planning, context-fit, and conflict-sensitive programming that ensures accountability and responsibility for the local authorities and prevents resource misuse. This will make it easier for the CBCR Activity to take advantage of opportunities and address barriers.

⁶⁴ Ibid

⁶⁵ Ibid

⁶⁶ International Crisis group, supra n 48.

⁶⁷ FGDs with male and female groups, Kersa Dula and Dollo Ado, Somalia, September 24, 2022

2.13. Mapping key actors and institutions

The work of key players (including community-based organizations, community/clan leaders, international partners, government structures, and informal business entities/individuals) is the foundation for the successful design and implementation of the CBCR Activity. Individual participants will collaborate to create either a favorable environment for the project's successful execution or a hostile environment that will impede its progress. Participants in the implementation of CBCR activities are classified as either facilitators or disruptors.

3.2.1. Facilitators in the Implementation of Activities

The main goal of the CBCR Activity is to enhance resilience and, thus, reduce the need for humanitarian assistance among communities in the cross-border clusters of Moyale and Mandera. The national and local governments, clan elders, local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community networks (such as youth and women), and other enabling players and institutions are all present in the Moyale cluster and Ethiopia's Somali region that falls in the Mandera cluster.

By signing the bilateral agreement for the Moyale economic corridor⁶⁸, the governments of Kenya and Ethiopia agreed to share the burden of maintaining law and order in the corridor by deploying security forces. Respondents from both sides of the Moyale cluster stated that the two national governments have good policies, strategies, and programs. Both governments delegated transit personnel/staff to manage the import-export system for their respective countries. The Moyale corridor has sophisticated infrastructure and trading systems. This advanced border transit system between Ethiopia and Kenya is in place to improve the modern and legal economic system by reducing the importance of illegal traders and informal business activities in the area.

Kenya's 2010 Constitution assigns responsibility for planning to both the national and county levels of government. The implementation of development policies and strategies for the nation's social, economic, and political transformation falls under the purview of the county governments. Article 220 (2) of the constitution requires counties to develop five-year County Integrated Development Plans (CIDPs) to guide county planning and budgeting activities. County development planning should be based on integrated national values, equity, resource mobilization, and the concerns of minorities and marginalized groups. The growth and development plan for natural resource management and improving the livelihoods of the pastoral and agro-pastoral communities are embedded within the national and county development plans⁶⁹.

As per the Kenyan Constitution, all local-level development planning in Marsabit County takes a bottom-up planning approach, with greater participation of the locals. As such, all funding to respective county government structures goes as stipulated in the constitution.

⁶⁸ United Nations Development Programme. (2022). *Cross-border cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Marsabit-Moyale cluster*. <https://www.undp.org/kenya/projects/cross-border-cooperation-between-ethiopia-and-kenya-conflict-prevention-and-peacebuilding-marsabit-moyale-cluster>.

⁶⁹ Chapter 11 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010.

The main target of the first Marsabit CIDP (2013-2017)⁷⁰ was to enhance the county's subsequent CIDPs. The second CIDP (2018-2022)⁷¹ was put in place after a rigorous consultative process at the county level, which included wards' public participation forums, sector working group consultations, professional forums, elected leaders forums, and non-state actors forums, among others.

Governments play a crucial role in developing and carrying out policies that promote economic progress. These comprise, among other things, market linkages for livestock products, policies that promote the expansion of livestock farming and business through the creation of efficient value chains, and increased access to agricultural extension services. According to literature and the primary data, the highest governing body of the county is the County Assembly which is entrusted with a legislative mandate. The Public Service Board, the Executive Office of the Governor, and Marsabit Municipality are other higher offices of the county. Other departments are the Public Service and Administration (PSA); Health Services (HSs); Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (ALF); Water, Environment and Natural Resources (WENRs); and Roads, Transport and Public Works (RTPWs).

The ALF is mandated to strengthen collaboration and linkages with public and private institutions in the management and delivery of agricultural programs and services; develop and approve instruments for operation and accountability of agriculture sector programs and projects; facilitate development, review, implementation, monitoring of policies, strategies, standards, regulations, plans, legislations of relevance to the sector; and develop mechanisms for management and dissemination of agricultural information.

The Department of WENRs is mandated to protect the degradation of natural resources (such as water, soil, and land). The department's core business is to ensure that the necessary infrastructure for the county's development is built to the highest standards, county roads are maintained in good condition, and that transport within the county is managed. The Department of Finance and Economic Planning (DFEP) is another important county department that is responsible for financial utilization planning and economic development⁷². Therefore, the county government's structures are among the vital facilitators of the CBCR Activity.

On the Ethiopian side of the cluster, the regional government of Oromia is the most visible facilitator of the CBCR Activity's operations. The CBCR Activity may work with various regional bureaus, including the Bureau for Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Irrigation to help build more resilience and sustainable agriculture; the Bureau of Water and Energy, and the Environment Protection Commission for climate-smart interventions and protection of the environment, as part of the Ethiopian government's agenda for economic empowerment of local communities⁷³.

Similarly, the Somali regional government is critical for the upcoming CBCR Activity because it includes those who will benefit at the grassroots level. The framework for the region's development plan is embedded in Ethiopia's 10-year prosperity road map (2021-2030)⁷⁴ and annual work plans. As

⁷⁰ Marsabit County (2013). *Revised First County Integrated Development Plan, Marsabit*.
<https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/>.

⁷¹ Marsabit County (2017). *Second County Integrated Development Plan (2018-2022)*.
<file:///C:/Users/HM/Downloads/Marsabit%20County%/>.

⁷² <https://www.marsabit.go.ke/departments/finance-economic-planning>.

⁷³ Oromia Regional Government. (2020). Chaffee Oromia approved 90-billion-birr budget for 2020 Fiscal Year (<https://www.fanabc.com/english/oromia-approves-90-bn-birr-budget-appointment-of-officials/>)

⁷⁴ Federal Government of Ethiopia. (2021). *Ten-Year Development Plan, A Pathway to Prosperity (2021 – 2030)*.
<https://eubfe.eu/index.php/en/downloads/149-ethiopia-2030-the-pathway-to-prosperity-10-years-perspective->

a result, the CBCR Activity's actions must be incorporated into these plans to ensure local ownership and sustainability long after the project is completed.

In addition, the national governments of Kenya and Ethiopia lead the charge to maintain law and order in the unstable Mandera cluster area. Due to its proximity to borders, the region is more vulnerable to violent extremism, inter-clan conflicts, livestock rustling, and sporadic unrest. Even with the disruption brought on by terrorism, the governments have been able to maintain peace and tranquility by collaborating closely with local leaders as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. Local government representatives and community elders are key actors in resolving conflicts and fostering social cohesion. Conflict resolution laws have been established by the governments with the help of the people, and they have significantly improved in recent years. The effectiveness of participation in containing the spread of conflict has considerably improved. One such instance is the community's involvement in planning an area's growth to avoid conflicts of interest⁷⁵.

Across the Moyale cluster and beyond, the Oromo have long-lasting dispute-resolution mechanisms where the *Abbaa Gadaas*⁷⁶ and *Haadha Siinqee* and clan leaders and councils of elders resolve any dispute between clans and other ethnic groups. Moreover, both women's and men's community groups are essential in sustaining peace in the communities. These groups are traditionally considered to be an indigenous peace weapon of Oromo culture and are used to stop violence and build a sustainable, mutually peaceful environment and relationships based on the values and norms of a society. Therefore, the CBCR Activity should actively engage the *Abbaa Gadaa*, *Haadha Siinqee*, clan leaders, and councils of elders to ensure that it gets support as well as awareness among communities. Equally, it is important to engage the women and youth of the communities.

The communities at the Moyale borderlands, like many others in Ethiopia, are patriarchal, with women playing far less of a role than men. Women make few decisions and have far fewer resources than men. Discussions⁷⁷ with study participants in the Moyale and Mandera clusters proved that there is gender inequality across both clusters. The Borana, Gabra, Garre, and other communities dwelling in the clusters are socially organized in patriarchal clan formations, leaving women with little or no independent voices. As a result, women are believed to share the same worldview as their husbands and men in general. That is why, in this study, women's voices are not proportional to men's, not because they had no ideas on themes pertinent to the study, but because culture itself prevents women from expressing their views on problems outside of domestic duties⁷⁸. Nonetheless, the *Haadha Siinqees* still play roles in community-based peace-building negotiations and protection of women's rights in the area. Hence, they may play roles in the CBCR Activity in the future.

The Somali clans have their dispute resolution institutions. In most cases, every clan has alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, which the clan uses in its relationship with other clans⁷⁹. In this regard,

development-plan-ethiopia.

⁷⁵ United Nations Development Programme. (2022). *Final Evaluation of the Cross-Border Cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Marsabit-Moyale Cluster*. <https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/detail/12953>.

⁷⁶ The Oromo Gadaa system has a great role in peacebuilding. It embraces peaceful peace-building values and approaches useful to maintain durable, lasting, and sustainable peace in society.

⁷⁷ Interview with Community leader, Moyale Sub- County, Kenya, 24 September 2022.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Pankhurst, A & Assefa, G. (2009). *Grass-Roots Justice in Ethiopia: Understanding Customary Dispute Resolution in Ethiopia*. Centre français des études éthiopiennes.

Accord⁸⁰ documented that when two parties are at odds, the traditional body of elders of the two opposing parties convenes a clan assembly to discuss the issues at hand. The elders research relevant precedents or *Xeer* (Somali customary law) on the subject. Somali customary law is generally compensatory rather than punitive. The jurisdiction of the former type is limited to the cases arising between two disputants of the same clan, while the latter governs when there is a dispute between two persons of different clans. These types of clan dispute resolutions (CDR) are available for all community members, even though women and the members of the outcast groups are allowed to take part only through representation⁸¹. Therefore, the CBCR Activity can employ *Xeer* as an indigenous mechanism or strategy to settle inter-clan conflicts and uphold harmonious clanship community coexistence among the local Somali population.

Concerning the role of Islam in Somali peace-building, the interviewed clan leaders indicated that Islam is inextricably linked to the identity of Somali, providing a unified identity for all Somalis regardless of clan affiliations or cultural backgrounds. Islam is an important part of daily life including the peaceful co-existence of the Somali people. Through their religious and traditional charismatic appeal, Islamic leaders, or Sheikhs, can serve as facilitators of the CBCR Activity since the community members are more likely to follow them than any formal office in the local administration.

International organizations such as the UN, IGAD, and INGOs such as the Red Cross, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), World Bank, USAID, the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), the EU, Mercy Corps, Save the Children, and World Vision, have also been working on cross-border peace-building and resilience activities⁸². According to study respondents, these organizations' initiatives are good, and should not be one-time interventions. Rather, they should focus on sustainable and long-lasting strategies that empower the cross-border communities to take over long-lasting peace-building by implementing poverty alleviation programs and infrastructure development, given that the areas are arid and semi-arid and the majority of the communities' livelihoods are dependent on nomadic herding. As such, lifestyle-changing programs such as resettlement, modernizing livestock breeding and feeding through forage plantations, drilling borehole waters points for the cattle, and raising the pastoralist communities' awareness to diversify their livelihoods activities to include trade and business should be promoted. In the long run, such interventions will stop cross-border grazing, which is usually the cause of conflict during drought seasons due to a shortage of animal feed and depletion of water points.

Some suggested sustainable development projects are likely to change the lifestyle of the pastoralist communities. These include education, vocational training for the youth and women, small-scale irrigation, improved cartels across the corridor, resettlement programs, and so forth. The CBCR Activity can engage with local and international organizations to ensure that there is no duplication of efforts, and that there is maximum coordination amongst different actors to deliver the most optimal impact on livelihoods. The CBCR Activity can also participate in different coordination meetings among partners based on thematic areas. This will provide an opportunity to coordinate and learn from each other.

⁸⁰ Accord (2017). *Reinvigoration of Somali Traditional Justice through Inclusive Conflict Resolution Approaches*. Conflict and Resilience Monitor 2017/3. <https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/reinvigoration-somali-traditional-justice-inclusive-conflict-resolution-approaches/>

⁸¹ Pankhurst, & Assefa, supra n 79.

⁸² FGD and KIIs in Dawa, Liben, Afder Zone and Boran zones.

One of the clan leaders⁸³ in the Borana zone who participated in this study recommended that the government of each country should develop a clear policy, plan, and strategy that aligns with pastoralist livelihoods separately from crop producers to improve the livelihoods of pastoralists, improve feed and fodder production, drilling of boreholes and construction of dams for water catchment to reduce conflict over water, and establishing formal livestock markets to cross-border pastoralists. The government should collaborate with community customary institutions (community-based organizations) and NGOs to address peace-building and resilience building in the area. In this regard, the *Abbaa Gadaa* and rangeland management committees are employed as best practices by the communities in the area for peace-building and social integration. With the *Abbaa Gadaa*, permissions are granted to communities to cross the border peacefully to graze their livestock where the climate conditions are better.

The study participant revealed that communities living in the border regions of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia share similar social-cultural backgrounds and means of subsistence. In addition, these communities have progressive aspirations towards (a) improving their economic situations, (b) enhancing livelihoods and coping capacities, and (c) reducing conflict from overutilization of shared resources. This was evident across multiple sectors in (a) the increased adoption of irrigated farming as complementary and as an alternative to primarily pastoralist lifestyles, (b) interest in the adoption of coping strategies such as investment in fodder cultivation and storage, (c) establishment of farmers' marketing cooperatives, (d) a desire for youth to be engaged in income-generating activities, and (e) desire for marginalized and vulnerable communities to be included in decision-making and have access to development opportunities.

Any intervention in the cross-border clusters, be it economic or natural resource management (NRM) needs to establish the necessary partnerships or incentivize existing partnerships to respond to and build on the aspirations of these communities. Existing I/NGOs and government sectors have been engaged in these activities, and future programming by the CBCR Activity and any development partners should continue to focus on peace-building, strengthening pastoralist and agro-pastoral livelihoods, market development, and youth and women's economic employment activities⁸⁴.

In Marsabit Country, one of the study participants mentioned that the livestock production system forms the backbone of the pastoralists' food security system. Diseases, drought, and cattle rustling seriously affect the livestock production sector. Livestock losses due to drought damage household economies and cause poverty, facilitating pastoralists to dropout from the pastoralist lifestyle. Drought crises resulting from rainfall shortage break down families, and trigger pastoralist labor mobility to major towns in search of jobs as a drought coping strategy and self-restocking mechanism. INGOs are currently working on pastoralists' food security system and development needs, reproductive health needs, and water system and development needs in Sololo sub-county. Hence, future programming by the CBCR Activity and other development partners should continue to focus on peace-building, strengthening pastoralist and agro-pastoral livelihoods, and pastoralist water and animal fodder needs⁸⁵.

3.2.2. Disruptors in the implementation activities

Some of the potential disruptors to implementing the CBCR Activity in the Moyale cluster and the Somali region of Ethiopia include informal business groups (smugglers), violent extremist groups such

⁸³ Interview with clan leader, from Borana zone, Ethiopia, September 28, 2022.

⁸⁴ Interview with key informant, Dollo Ado district, Somalia, September 28, 2022.

⁸⁵ Interview with key informant, Sololo sub- county, Kenya, September 26, 2022.

as the Al-Shabaab, secessionist groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front /Army (OLF/OLA) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), ethnic and clan-based conflicts, climate change, and unemployed youth.

Smugglers, for example, have a significant impact on the performance of the CBCR Activity. They control cross-border trade routes that compete with the legal trade works (export-import between the two countries), and provide income for a segment of the population through the illicit trade in weapons. Human traffickers enlist victims for the goal of exploitation using a variety of techniques. Smugglers of illegal immigrants take advantage of people looking to escape suffering and pursue a better life by helping them enter a nation illegally. The number of people being smuggled across borders is increasing, particularly that of young people seeking better opportunities in other African countries, such as South Africa and Botswana, and Western countries⁸⁶. By and large, the informal cross-border traders preying on helpless youth and women illicitly crossing the border for economic purposes may significantly disrupt the works of the CBCR Activity in the clusters.

The presence of many unemployed youths across the Moyale cluster and the Somali region is a big threat to the implementation of the CBCR Activity. A study by Halima et al⁸⁷ indicates that poverty and unemployment are two of the most pressing development issues in the region. Only a few youths work in productive labor in Moyale sub-county. Most of the youth sit around in the village or by the roadside all day, chewing *khat* or engaging in crime while high on drugs. Some young people in Marsabit County make their living primarily through trade of livestock and charcoal, and *boda boda*. However, these economic activities are hampered by the lack of a livestock market and frequent cases of cattle rustling in the county, as well as poor road networks and insecurity.

Even though special funds have been established to assist in financing youth development activities, there is little visible evidence that the youth in this region are benefiting from the same. Access to loans, business infrastructure, market support, and networks are deemed insufficient for facilitating effective poverty alleviation/self-employment among the youth.

Because there are routes in the clusters that are human trafficking corridors, young people and women are persuaded by unreal promises of employment and better opportunities, only to be lured in by their kidnappers or traffickers and held for ransom. The majority of smugglers' victims are tortured while being carried and, occasionally, they are kept in such terrible conditions that they die or incur other serious injuries.

More worryingly, secessionist groups, such as the OLA and the ONLF, and the extremist Al-Shabaab pose significant threats to the implementation of the CBCR Activity. The OLA is a faction of the OLF that claims to fight for the rights of Ethiopia's ethnic Oromo, who account for roughly 40 percent of the population. In May 2021, the Ethiopian parliament designated the OLA a terrorist organization⁸⁸. OLA may cause disruption in cross-border areas and may have an impact on CBCR activities. As the borders are porous and far from both countries' central governments, the OLA has been creating social and economic instability across the borderlands.

⁸⁶ Mixed Migration Center (2023). *Southbound: Mixed Migration Routes, Experiences, and risks along the journey to South Africa*. MMC Research Report. https://mixedmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/274_Southbound_Report.pdf.

⁸⁷ Halima, I., Golicha, M. N. & Wilkins, N.M. (2019). *The Uwezo Fund and Poverty Reduction in Moyale Sub –County in Marsabit County, Kenya*. <http://dspace.pacuniversity.ac.ke:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/3444?show=full>

⁸⁸ Ibid.

For its part, the ONLF is a social and political movement founded in 1984 to campaign for the right to self-determination for Somalis in the Somali region of Ethiopia. The ONLF is categorized as a separatist rebel group fighting in eastern Ethiopia to create an independent state. Its armed wing, the Ogaden Liberation Army (ONLA), has waged a violent insurgency against the Ethiopian government since its establishment. Although not declared a terrorist group by the Ethiopian federal government, they have been creating social and economic instability across the borderlands in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya⁸⁹.

The Al-Shabaab has been disrupting the economic and social stability in parts of Ethiopia's Somali region⁹⁰. The group continues to pose significant dangers to the population due to its wide presence in Somalia. According to study respondents, although violent extremism impacts the entire community, it disproportionately affects low-income households, minority clans, children, the aged, and women. The young people who are most at risk are attracted to violent extremist organizations, radicalized, and persuaded to join militias and terrorist organizations in the pursuit of monthly stipends.

Therefore, to succeed in its objectives, the CBCR Activity should be alert to the imminent threats of extremist groups, and play a vital role in sensitizing the youths and marginalized groups to their potential dangers.

Moreover, climate change and its adverse impacts on the Moyale cluster and Ethiopia's Somali region are a reality. Areas along the Ethiopia-Kenya border are severely affected by adverse impacts such as drought, water scarcity, food insecurity, and other drought-induced adverse impacts. Droughts are becoming more frequent and severe in the region as water scarcity and temperatures rise⁹¹. Thus, conflicts among pastoralists are intensifying as they travel further south in search of water and grazing land. Because of their transnational and protracted nature, these conflicts present a unique challenge to local peace-building and disarmament efforts. This may disrupt the upcoming CBCR activities in the area.

3.3. Controversial issues in decision-making and implementation of planned activities

Controversial issues include territorial disputes that are persistent and potential conflict triggers across the clusters. Moreover, in Ethiopia's Somali region, the ONLF claims that Ethiopia is an occupying government, despite Ogaden representation in the Ethiopian federal government by groups such as the Somali People's Democratic Party (SPDP). The Somali region also neighbors Somaliland, which has controversial relationships with Somalia, hence its proximity to the conflicts therein. Partly because of tensions between the two states, there was a recent conflict in Las Anod region of Somaliland that led to the inflow of refugees into Jigjiga⁹². The Somali region and Somaliland have a large porous borderland, where there is frequent civil unrest because of the presence of extremist groups in the area⁹³.

⁸⁹ Ylönen, A. (2022). *The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the dilemma of liberation*. In Bach, J., Abbink, J., Ancel, S., Ahmed, A., Fantini, E., Ferras, P., Mwakimako, H., Nallet, C., Ylönen, A. & Záhořík, J. (Eds). *Routledge Handbook of the Horn of Africa*. Routledge.

⁹⁰ Conclusions based on series of discussions and key informant interviews in the region.

⁹¹ African Renewal. (2022). Horn of Africa: Extreme drought deepens hunger in a region facing conflict. <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/november-2022/horn-africa-extreme-drought-deepens-hunger-region-facing-conflict>.

⁹² United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2023): *Food aid and Fund shortage at Las Anod*. <https://www.unhcr.org/report-to-las-anod-somalia>

⁹³ Ibid

Moyale town has occasionally experienced prolonged conflict emerging from inter-ethnic differences over the land ownership rights where the town is founded. For example, the Moyale clashes of July 2012 were a series of ethnic clashes between the Borana and the Garre communities on the Ethiopian border with Kenya⁹⁴. The fighting appeared to be caused by a long-standing dispute over land possession, exacerbated by recent drought conditions⁹⁵.

As per the Borana elders, the Dawa zone of the Somali region in Ethiopia is perceived as their land, and its ownership by the Garre communities is only because of the expansionist behavior of the Garre into Borana land⁹⁶. Several clashes have happened in Moyale town where armed militias reportedly took positions in villages. At this point the fighting spread into Moyale itself, businesses were shut in Moyale on both sides of the border, and homes in the villages of Chamuki and Shawabarre were reported to have been burnt down⁹⁷. Until today, the Borana do not accept the naming (Dawa zone) and see the land as their ancestral land, which was taken by the expansionist Garre communities. Such a mindset could fuel future conflicts among both pastoralist communities.

A large number of informal traders dwell in Moyale town (in Kenya), as it is a major trade route for goods from Kenya to Ethiopia. The town has a commercial advantage and attracts both formal and informal traders. The boom in trade, especially in livestock commodities and smuggled goods (especially illegal guns), is a major propellant for inter-ethnic conflicts⁹⁸. The presence of high-level informal traders undermines legal trade. Such smuggling business will sometimes take the form of ethnic business and fuel conflict when the informal traders align with their ethnicity to exacerbate the conflict⁹⁹.

Adopting a conflict-sensitive approach to programming could minimize the risks associated with such controversial issues. Hence the CBCR Activity should design and implement programs with this understanding of the operational context.

3.4. Socio-Economic and Political Conflicts and the CBCR Activity

This section focuses on the interactions between the CBCR Activity and the socioeconomic and political conflicts in the border clusters, as well as the potential and challenges for conflict-sensitive programming. This section will detail the most common reasons for political conflict in each cluster, as described by key informants and participants in focus groups. As a result, the following discussion focuses on the dominant smuggling (illegal) trade, ethnic disputes, and the influence of violent extremist groups.

3.4.1 The Moyale Cluster

The Moyale corridor serves as a route for the illegal trade of goods from Kenya to Ethiopia, as well as livestock and cereals from Ethiopia to Kenya, due to the porous nature of the border and the large area

⁹⁴ Interview with key informant, Moyale town, Ethiopia, 24 September 2022.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ FGD with Borana elders, Borana zone, Ethiopia 24, September 2023.

⁹⁷ FGD with Borana elders, Borana Zone, 24, September 2023

⁹⁸ Interview with the key informant, Moyale town, Ethiopia, September 24, 2022.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

it encompasses. The growth of informal trade, particularly in livestock, electronics, clothing, drugs, other smuggled goods (such as illicit weapons), and human trafficking has greatly exacerbated clan conflicts. This is due to the fact that each clan or group of people wants to rule the unofficial areas, which leads to a series of disputes. This has implications for CBCR activities in that it may disrupt them unless properly managed using any locally available mechanisms that can mitigate the negative impacts.

The Moyale cluster has been embroiled in a protracted conflict caused by violent extremists who recruit unemployed youths and those migrating from the central to other countries like South Africa and to Europe in search of better opportunities by crossing the Moyale cluster¹⁰⁰. The social issues in cross-border towns have worsened because OLA recruited these young people. This may harm the CBCR's activities in the future if the situation continues unabated.

The CBCR Activity may encourage increased cooperation and coordination among various security agencies to collaborate with local communities to eliminate the threat of violent extremism and radicalization. It may also improve the ability of conflict resolution committees to resolve water and land disputes, especially as communities compete for limited resources during the drought. Women and other vulnerable community groups and minorities may be encouraged to participate in the process of developing solutions for more sustainable, peaceful coexistence, thereby positively contributing to CBCR activities along cross borders.

The ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia, as well as the current boundary demarcation between the Somali and Oromia regions, may have implications for CBCR cross-border activities, as this has fueled conflict in the country, particularly across the Moyale cluster between the Garre (Somali) and the Borana (Oromo). Self-government, shared governance, regional empowerment, regional autonomy, and unity in diversity are all advocated for by ethnic federalism. However, misunderstanding and misinterpretation of federalism has resulted in recurring conflict in Ethiopia's Oromia and Somali regions over border demarcation¹⁰¹. With potential indigenous peace-building efforts by other NGOs operating in the Moyale cluster, this could be one of the potential opportunities for the CBCR Activity to prioritize peace-building and community resilience activities as part of its comprehensive programming.

Moreover, as highlighted by FGD respondents from Moyale cluster, conflict affects men, women, and youth group, destroys the livelihoods of the pastoralist communities, disrupts both the formal and informal businesses, restricts human and livestock movement, and increases the level of tension and poverty in the cluster. According to study participants, during cross-border conflicts, everything will collapse, including business, trade, and human and livestock movement of pastoralist communities. This will, in turn, completely kill socio-economic activities, and adversely impact CBCR activities. Limited movements for pastoralists will put livestock and human beings at risk of dying due to a lack of enough pasture and drinking water¹⁰². Hence, the CBCR Activity should promote the efforts of local communities, the *Ugaas*, the *Abbaa Gadaa*, councils of elders, and clan leaders, in building peace and stability by discouraging fighting among the brotherly cross-border communities.

¹⁰⁰ Africa Union (2020). *A Study on the Roles and Contributions of Youth to Peace and Security in Africa an Independent Expert Report Commissioned by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union*.
<https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-study-youth-africa-web.pdf>

¹⁰¹ Taye, *supra* n 47.

¹⁰² FGDs with study participants in Moyale Town in Marsabit country and Moyale Town in the Borana zone, September 26, 2022.

In addition to the conflicts in the area, climate change and variability pose risks to pastoralists who rely on climate-sensitive livelihoods and natural resources daily. Aside from the physiological effects of higher temperatures on individual animals, the loss of animals due to droughts and floods and disease epidemics caused by climate change may increase. Ecosystem changes that alter the distribution of animal diseases or feed supply may have indirect effects. Furthermore, the spatial distribution and availability of pasture and water are highly dependent on rainfall patterns and availability. Changes in rainfall patterns and temperature ranges will impact feed availability, grazing ranges, feed quality, and the occurrence of weeds, pests, and diseases¹⁰³.

Study participants across the clusters stated that frequent droughts caused by climate change in recent years have resulted in a shortage of pasture and water. This is a recent memory for communities because they lost livestock in 2021, 2022, and 2023¹⁰⁴. In response to erratic weather patterns and harsh climates that change every five to ten years, cross-border communities have adopted a nomadic agro-pastoralist way of life. The race to dominate the existing good pasture and water points for their cattle across border areas causes conflict. Such cyclical events have existed for centuries across border communities. Recurring climatic disasters, without a doubt, have significant implications for the CBCR's activities, as they may impede the proper implementation of its activities in some way¹⁰⁵.

3.4.2 The Somali Region

The presence of violent extremist groups, civil war, and/or cross-border clashes among clans or ethnic groups have implications for the CBCR Activity's programming. Nowadays, terrorism across the border is fueled by political interest groups with a stake in the nation, such as the Al-Shabaab and the ONLF. Furthermore, communal attacks to compensate for losses in previous wars were mentioned as causes of conflict, along with cattle raids and counter-raid attacks¹⁰⁶.

Respondents agreed that the CBCR Activity should encourage new livelihood approaches or the improvement of existing ones to close the job and economic empowerment gaps, and address these social disasters to mitigate the adverse impacts therein. The CBCR Activity should also encourage collaboration and coordination among various security agencies to work with the local communities to eliminate the threat of violent extremism and radicalization, and strengthen the ability of conflict resolution committees to resolve disputes over water and land. The CBCR Activity may also adequately involve women and vulnerable groups in its programming processes.

Climate change and variability pose risks to pastoralists who rely heavily on climate-sensitive livelihoods and natural resources (such as water points and pastureland), as is the case in the Moyale cluster. This has a significant impact on CBCR activities, either directly or indirectly. Aside from the physiological effects of higher temperatures on individual animals, the loss of animals due to droughts and floods and disease epidemics caused by climate change may increase. Furthermore, the spatial distribution and availability of pasture and water are highly dependent on rainfall patterns and

¹⁰³ Tiruneh, S. & Tegene F. (2018). Impacts of climate change on Livestock production and productivity and different adaptation strategies in Ethiopia. *Journal of Nutrition and Health Sciences*, 5(4), 1-8.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with the key informant, Moyale town, Kenya, September 26, 2022.

¹⁰⁵ Interview with the key informant, Moyale town, Oromia, September 27, 2022.

¹⁰⁶ FGDs and interviews in Liben Zone and Dolo Ado district, Somalia, September 26, 2022.

availability. Changes in rainfall patterns and temperature ranges will impact feed availability, grazing ranges, feed quality, and weed, pest, and disease incidence¹⁰⁷.

3.5 Gender equality and inclusion across cross-border communities

Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI) is a concept that addresses unequal power relations experienced by people on the grounds of gender, wealth, ability, location, ethnicity, language, and agency, or a combination of these dimensions. Inclusion goes beyond encouraging people, it requires making sure that adequate policies and practices are in effect in the community beyond the existing cultural and social norms and values. Inclusion should lead to increased participation in socially expected life roles and activities, such as being a student, worker, friend, community member, patient, spouse, partner, or parent¹⁰⁸.

Study respondents from both the Moyale and Mandera cross-border clusters confirmed the existence of unequal power relationships between men and women¹⁰⁹. Women and people with disability are the most marginalized community groups, and this is supported by cultural and religious norms and values. Youth are the second most marginalized group in the community, and they are not eligible to make decisions or have control over resources.

Respondents also acknowledged that widowed or single women have the power and right to manage their livestock, land, and other resources and make decisions and have control over their resources, compared to married women across the cluster¹¹⁰. There are also initiatives by the Ethiopian and Kenyan governments to educate women, particularly low-income and vulnerable women, to overcome their difficult situations. These include providing them with training about savings and credit.

Traditionally, women in the Somali region live in a well-organized patriarchal society, where the relations among individuals are based on kinship or the clan, which decides the position of every individual within the group. Kinship is traced through the father and, as a result, men occupy a higher position than women in the social hierarchy. In such a society, a woman's role is chiefly seen in childbearing, child-rearing, and household tasks¹¹¹. Religious and cultural values reinforce this subordinate place of Somali women. The overall decision-making rests with the male head, who serves as the arbiter in disputes and the custodian of family properties. Women's economic autonomy is also limited and highly dependent on their male companions. The ideology of kinship has acknowledged their rights and duties to be only mediated by men¹¹².

Similarly, communities in the Moyale cluster (Borana, Garre, and Gabbra) mentioned that they are organized in a patriarchal clan formation, where women's voices are not proportional to men's. This is not because they had no ideas on themes pertinent to the study, but because culture itself prevents women from expressing their views on problems outside of domestic duties¹¹³.

¹⁰⁷ Tiruneh & Tegene, supra n 104.

¹⁰⁸ Drucza, K.L & Abebe, L. (2018). *Gender Equality and Social Inclusion in Agriculture Research for Development Guidelines*. Gender Impact Platform (<https://gender.cgiar.org/publications/gender-equality-and-social-inclusion-agriculture-research-development-guidelines>).

¹⁰⁹ FGDs in Moyale and Mandera cluster, 21-26, September 2022.

¹¹⁰ Women FGD discussion, Dolo Ado district, Somali region, September 24, 2022.

¹¹¹ FGD discussion with businesswomen, Dolo Ado, Somali region, September 26, 2022

¹¹² FGD with businesswomen, Kersa Dula District, 24 September 2022.

¹¹³ Interview with community leader, Moyale Sub- County, Kenya, 24 September 2022.

Women often face different and more basic economic constraints than men, including less access to credit and markets, and control over basic resources in the community. To break these barriers, the discussants recommended wide-scale behavioral change interventions across the corridor on gender equality. Once the cultural and social barriers are broken, the next step will be working on women's empowerment activities. These activities include economic empowerment which includes special support for women to begin their small businesses. Such an intervention will help women to create businesses and secure their livelihoods.

Moreover, access to credit will encourage adequate financing for female-owned businesses at a lower interest through the Development Credit (DC). Economic empowerment will, in turn, empower their decision-making power in households and the community on basic resources such as land, water, capital, and other resources.

3.6 Inclusion of people with disability and minority groups

Including people with disabilities (PWDs) and minority groups in everyday activities and encouraging them to have roles similar to their peers is defined as inclusion.

Much needs to be done in terms of inclusion of PWDs and minorities across Moyale and Mandera clusters. There are cultural and social misunderstandings ascribed to disability as a divine curse across the communities. According to study respondents, PWDs are not sent to school or provided with physical aid materials such as crutches and wheelchairs. Not involving PWDs, the poor, the sick, and other vulnerable minorities in decision-making at household levels stigmatizes them¹¹⁴.

3.7 Windows Of Opportunity for CBCR Activity Impact on Decision-Making and Implementation

The interaction of the various actors will determine how well the CBCR Activity is implemented. Some of the key stakeholders that the CBCR Activity has an opportunity to work with in the Moyale cluster include officials in the Marsabit County Government, the Oromia and Somali regional states, the Liben and Afder zonal administrations, the *Abbaa Gadaa*, *Ugaas*, councils of elders, local and international partners, religious leaders, youth and women networks, and minority groups.

To ensure the success of the CBCR Activity, local government officials should work with all traditional leaders, including the *Abbaa Gadaa*, *Haadha Siinqee*, *Ugaas*, clan leaders, and councils of elders. These leaders are respected in the community and can help to promote the project's importance and foster an environment that will make its implementation easier. Because of their tremendous influence on the neighborhood and local authorities, the clan leaders and councils of elders are key players in implementation. The *Abbaa Gadaa*, the *Ugaas*, and clan elders will assist in resolving disputes, allocating resources fairly, and advocating for open, accountable, and corruption-free leadership.

Other NGOs that are engaged in work comparable or complementary to the goals of the CBCR Activity should also be considered strategic partners with whom to collaborate, while engaging in shared learning. As a result, early engagement with these groups of people will be essential to the success of the intervention. As a result, tailored capacity-building and awareness-raising sessions will be crucial to fortifying the strength and boosting readiness among these groups of people.

¹¹⁴ Women FGD discussion, Dolo Ado district, September 24, 2022.

The CBCR Activity may be required to make social unity a more prominent component of its content. This entails devising measures to mitigate the negative effects of inter-clan conflicts, while promoting the positive aspects of clannism, such as bringing members of society together. To reverse the effects of youth radicalization, the initiative must also focus on counter-violent extremism interventions.

The CBCR Activity ought to work towards encouraging the development of fresh businesses or expanding established ones to close the employment and economic empowerment gaps. This can involve developing interventions that improve connectivity in economic corridors through road and rail infrastructure to speed up the movement of goods and services across borders and access to other markets; eliminating bureaucratic border procedures by strengthening the existing border procedures to facilitate cross-border movement of goods and services; building special economic zones or markets to connect locally produced goods to consumers; and facilitating trade between economic zones or markets.

Even though there are several windows of opportunity, there are also challenges in developing conflict-sensitive programming that may impede the CBCR Activity. A history of human rights violations and armed conflict, which can foster mistrust, a lack of social cohesiveness, and vulnerability to recurring violence in cross-border communities are a few examples of these challenges.

Another potential barrier in the Moyale and Mandera clusters would be proxy armed groups supported by neighboring countries or foreign armed groups that oppose their government¹¹⁵. By and large, the design phase of conflict-sensitive programming must encompass locally owned interventions. Failure to do so may fail CBCR Activity. When implementing the cross-border project, there should also be a strong bottom-up approach, a participatory aspect, and the involvement of residents and local authorities.

¹¹⁵ Millian, I.M., Aspa, J.M. A., Garcia, J.U., Arestizabal, P.U., Arino, A.V. & Arino, M.V. (2022). *Alert 2022! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*. Icaria. <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/alert-2022-report-conflicts-human-rights-and-peacebuilding>

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The socioeconomic, political, peace, and security determinants in the Moyale cluster and the Somali region of Ethiopia (in the Mandera cluster) are their location on the periphery, overall underdevelopment in comparison to other regions in their respective countries, and a lack of infrastructure and social amenities. Pastoralism is the principal source of income for the local communities, and they also rely on cattle production and legal and informal cross-border trade.

The borderlands are distinguished by their experience with recurring drought, which has resulted in significant food insecurity, loss of livelihoods, and loss of life. Livestock farming, the backbone of the local economy, has been badly disrupted due to a lack of pasture and water. During drought, competition for scarce resources (water, pasture, grazing land, and rangeland) can lead to conflict, which affects livelihoods and lives.

Conflicts between clans and violent extremism remain authentic dangers. The communities have their own inbuilt traditional conflict resolution and peace-building efforts that need to be strengthened. Several inter-clan and terrorist attacks were common where government security apparatus came late after the incident happened. Proactive government responses are essential but are not effective without engaging the local peace-building efforts by traditional elders and clan leaders.

The lack of opportunities for young people, who are easy targets for radicals, is to blame for the rapid expansion of radicalization and terrorist networks. With the promise of monetary rewards, the terrorist gang members can enlist the helpless youths quickly. The majority of young people lack basic education and are illiterate, which restricts their access to available job opportunities and business financing from financial institutions.

Moreover, it has been identified that women and people with disability are the most marginalized community groups on the grounds of cultural and religious norms and values. The youth are the second most marginalized group in the community, and they are not eligible to make decisions or have control over resources.

4.1 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings of the APEA, the following recommendations were provided as a key focus for Chemonics and its USAID partners while implementing CBCR activities in the Moyale and Mandera Cluster:

4.1.2 Recommendations on facilitators in the implementation of CBCR activities

The potential facilitators in Marsabit County (Kenya), Borana zone (Ethiopia), and Somali region of Ethiopia include the local, regional (country), and national governments, clan elders, women leaders, and some local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

First, the government and its decentralized structures emerged as facilitators owing to their central authority and access to the region. Therefore, working with government structures at all levels helps to establish a good ground and make programs progressive and sustainable throughout the interventions. The national government was also recognized as a crucial facilitator because it provides decentralized

funding to the local administration, develops and implements policies/strategies, and oversees and regulates socioeconomic and political stability in the county (region).

Second, the role of all types of community-based structures (organizations) such as the *Ugaas* (Somali clanship leader), the *Abbaa Gadaa* (Oromo traditional democratic leadership system), and the *Adha Siinqee* (Oromo women in charge of peacekeeping), clan elders, councils of elders, organized women's groups, and organized youth groups are also potential facilitators. This is because they can use their communal charismatic influence for the ownership of the programs across Moyale and Mandera cluster. For example, the clan leaders, *Ugaas*, *Abba Gadda*, *Hadha Siinqee*, women, and youth groups play a significant role in Moyale's and Mandera politics, peacemaking, and conflict resolution. Hence, they create a better environment for the implementation of the CBCR Activity across the clusters. Working with community-based and religious organizations will benefit the CBCR Activity, and overlooking them will hurt the acceptability of the Activity by the larger community as they are gatekeepers for any program implementation in their localities.

Third, the role of I/NGOs as facilitators is key in both clusters as they have hands-on experience with the challenges and opportunities in the area, and have designed risk-sensitive programming. Therefore, working with them would further benefit the CBCR Activity as they can share vivid gaps and successes in program implementation and help avoid duplication of efforts. By sharing their best practices from already in-built knowledge management systems and established forums, they can also strengthen synergy.

4.1.3 Recommendations on disruptors in the implementation of CBCR activities

The main disruptors of the CBCR Activity were identified as violent extremist groups such as the Al-Shabaab, secessionist groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), ethnic and clan-based conflicts, and climate change.

On both sides of the border, the high youth unemployment rate has increased the vulnerability of the youth. As a result, they are easy prey for violent extremist groups and human traffickers, as they seek employment opportunities across borders. Resolving their economic challenges by creating context-fit and more productive businesses could potentially decline the appetite and interest of youth to be recruited by extremist groups. Although the main task of accommodating the political interests of extremist groups through peaceful political dialogue and discussion lies in the hands of the respective governments, some key issues like funding budgets for peaceful political dialogue and promoting the democratization process can be considered as future programming of the CBCR Activity. The CBCR Activity should also engage and work on the peace-building efforts by working with indigenous peace-building mechanisms established by local communities.

The negative effects of climate change on the pastoralists in the cluster are extremely frequent and sometimes unprecedented. While the government primarily focuses on the phases of recovery and rehabilitation, the top priority must be establishing a preventive approach through the implementation of adaptation and mitigation strategies. This can be done by using local resources and contacting potential donors for assistance in addressing the effects of climate change in the cluster and increasing feed availability, grazing ranges, improving feed quality, and preventing and controlling weed, pest, and disease incidence in the area. Hence, it is recommended that the CBCR Activity works with the government and I/NGOs on the mitigation and adaptation strategies, and solidify them with the indigenous knowledge across both clusters.

4.1.4 Recommendations on controversial issues

The controversial issues, such as territorial disputes between the Borana and Garre, were identified as persistent and potential conflict triggers across the clusters. Resolving such conflict is the role of the Ethiopian government, as such types of territorial disputes are prevalent all over the country. However, the CBCR Activity should focus on addressing the needs of the communities, and act accordingly to fill the gap of reasonable local interests.

The CBCR Activity should be cognizant of such conditions as they frequently fuel inter-ethnic and inter-clan conflict that might damage activity implementation. Being aware of such issues would help its risk-sensitive programming approach.

4.2 Recommendations on Addressing Gender Inequality and Social Inclusion

Respondents from Moyale and Mandera clusters confirmed the existence of unequal power relationships between men and women. Women and people with disability (PWDs) are the most marginalized community groups on the grounds of cultural and religious norms and values. The youth are the second most marginalized group in the community, and they are not eligible to make decisions or have control over resources.

Gender transformative approaches (GTA) are programs and interventions that create opportunities for individuals to actively challenge gender norms, promote positions of social and political influence for women in communities, and address power inequities between persons of different genders. Such a transformative approach doesn't appear overnight, and it needs gradual and long-term behavioral change programs to bring about the desired change.

Consequently, the governments of Kenya and Ethiopia have developed several policies and strategies to transform gender inequalities, however, not all the strategies were implemented as expected. Development partners like the CBCR Activity can design a program component to help the full-scale implementation of gender equality strategies developed by the respective governments across Moyale and Mandera clusters. The programs should engage the religious and traditional leaders, women, and youth who have a stake in challenging the prevailing gender inequality norms and values, mindsets, and perceptions related to patriarchal systems.

4.3.1 Better Ways of Handling Scarce Resource-Based Conflict

In the study area, it has been reported that there is an increasing trend of scarcity in key pastoral resources. As a result, there are often multiple claims mainly over grazing land and water points. Disputes over water points, grazing lands, and rangelands between pastoral herders from Marsabit County in Kenya and Oromia and Somali regions can be easily transformed into violent conflict. Coupled with the gradual deterioration of dispute settlement traditional approaches, the nature of violence often tends to be devastating.

For pastoralists, conflict is understood as a clash among or within ethnic groups due to overlapping interests. The study reveals that the underlying causes are diverse and complex. They can simply be

classified as *social, economic, institutional, and political where all can be mixed*. These factors include pasture and water scarcity, competition over land as linked to the place of water points, especially between clans and between ethnic groups where there is a dispute over the boundary, livestock raids, and the effort to get back the rustled animals by force.

- a) While infrastructure development is largely taken on by the respective governments, key programs like livestock resources development; watershed and water resources development; protection and development of natural resources and ensuring tenure security; and provision of social and economic services can be conducted by development partners. As mentioned here each sector needs specific programs designed to resolve the issues of scarcity.
- b) Strengthening indigenous (traditional) dispute resolution methods: As noted in previous sections, there are numerous community-based and created systems in the community. These include the councils of elders, clan leaders, *Abbaa Gadaa*, *Haadha Siinqee*, *Ugaas*, women's and youth networks. They have informal structures and bylaws, with assemblies and leaders that are widely accepted and functional in cross-border areas, and should be accessed by all development players, including the CBCR Activity. Launching indigenous peace-building programs, collaborating with traditional institutions, and supporting their final peace-building efforts could be seen as one of the CBCR Activity's future programs.

Creating conflict-free corridors across the corridors will enhance socio-economic activities and accelerate any developmental activities targeting the pastoralist communities. For example:

- Identifying youth organizations and community stakeholders and building community networks for the promotion of peace and reconciliation as the key to livelihoods sustainability
- Establishing a variety of peace-building platforms/activities such as 'Sports for Peace' environmental stewardships, peace marches, walks, and races, tree planting exercises etc., for youth mobilization to address resource-based conflicts and inter-ethnic/cross-border conflict situations through the promotion of solidarity among the conflicting communities.
- Raising awareness and capacity through training of local authorities, provincial administrations, Returnees and Refugees Services (RRS) officers, and partners on the risk factors of irregular migration, promoting safe migration, and incorporating peaceful coexistence and conflict prevention through the provision of alternative livelihoods.

5. ANNEX

ANNEX 1: GENDER EQUALITY AND YOUTH CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

Table 5: Study participants by clusters

According to the above table, 84% of the study participants are from Moyale Cluster, and 15.4% are from Mandera

Cluster and participated in the benchmark indicators survey.

CLUSTER		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Mandera Cluster	12	15.4	15.4	15.4
	Moyale Cluster	66	84.6	84.6	100.0
	Total	78	100.0	100.0	

Gender Equality over equal access to and control over social, economic, and political resources

Table 6: Respondents' perception of gender equality over equal access to social, economic, and political resources in the community

Results from the above table depict that a large number (46.2%: disagree and strongly disagree) of the respondents disagreed that across both clusters, men and women shouldn't have equal access to

DO YOU BELIEVE/AGREE THAT MALES AND FEMALES SHOULD HAVE EQUAL ACCESS TO SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL RESOURCES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN YOUR COMMUNITY?

Level of agreement	Frequency		Percent (%)
Level of agreement	Strongly disagree	2	2.6
	Disagree	34	43.6
	Neutral	2	2.6
	Agree	12	15.4
	Strongly Agree	28	35.9
	Total	78	100.0

social, economic, and political resources. This report is in line with qualitative findings that revealed women do not have equal access to, and control over resources compared to men. Although (51.3%), nearly half of them still agreed that women should have equal access to social, economic, and political resources and opportunities in their community.

Perception or belief that men make a better political decision than women

Table 7: Respondents' belief that men make better political decision than women

TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS? ON THE WHOLE, MEN MAKE BETTER POLITICAL DECISIONS THAN WOMEN AND SHOULD BE ELECTED RATHER THAN WOMEN

Level of agreement	Frequency		Percent
Level of agreement	Strongly disagree	35	44.9
	Disagree	23	29.5
	Neutral	4	5.1
	Agree	7	9.0
	Strongly Agree	9	11.5

The majority (74.8 %):

Total	78	100.0
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Strongly disagree and disagree) of the respondents have a better understanding that political decision-making opportunities should not be given to men; women must have come to power. On the contrary, significant (19.5%) numbers (19.5 %) of respondents still believe that political powers must be in the hands of men and women should not take part in political decision-making power.

Youth Participation in Civic Engagement Activities

Table 8: Perception on the youth civic engagement

Across the community, the majority (50%: Disagree +strongly disagree) of the respondents firmly reported their disagreement that there is no active participation of young people in age-appropriate activities that

DO YOU BELIEVE/AGREE THAT THERE IS THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF YOUNG PEOPLE IN AGE-APPROPRIATE ACTIVITIES THAT ADVANCE SOCIAL AND CIVIC OUTCOMES (FOR EXAMPLE IN COMMUNITY SERVICE, VOLUNTEERISM, PARTICIPATION IN/LEADERSHIP OF CSOs, YOUTH CLUBS/COUNCILS/ORGANIZATIONS, JOINING POLITICAL PARTIES OR YOUTH PARTY WINGS, EXPRESSION OF IDEAS/ADVOCACY TO EFFECT CHANGE)?

	Frequency	Percent
Strongly disagree	1	1.3
Disagree	38	48.7
Neutral	11	14.1
Agree	16	20.5
Strongly Agree	12	15.4
Total	78	100.0

advance their social and civic outcomes. Youth are not participating in volunteerism, in clubs and councils, or not joining political parties to express their ideas and effect change. However, a small number of respondents (35.9% Agree + S. Agree) agreed that youths are actively participating across the clusters. This indicates that there are initiatives that should be strengthened in the future.

Table 9: Perception of the women's civic engagement

The majority (43.6%: Strongly Disagree and Disagree) of the respondents disagree that there are no formal and non-formal activities (for youth participation platforms) that

TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS? ON THE WHOLE, MEN MAKE BETTER POLITICAL DECISIONS THAN WOMEN AND SHOULD BE ELECTED RATHER THAN WOMEN

	Frequency	Percent
Strongly disagree	1	1.3
Disagree	33	42.3
Neutral	19	24.4
Agree	22	28.2
Strongly Agree	3	3.8
Total	78	100.0

promote knowledge, attitudes, values, skills, and behaviors desired of citizens to increase youth political participation and civic engagement in the community.

Table 10: Youth leadership skills and Participation in Social and political structures

According to the above table, nearly half (48.7%) agreed that youths are not developing leadership skills through active participation in the existing social and political structures. This indicates that a sizable number of youths have been denied participation in social and political issues. On the other hand, (46.1%) of youths believe that youths across the study areas actively participate in social and political issues to the level that helps them develop their leadership skills in the community.

TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS? THERE ARE LEADERSHIP SKILLS THAT HELP YOUTH PARTICIPATE IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURES FOR INITIATING CHANGE THROUGH YOUTH-LED ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZING. EXAMPLE: PROJECT MANAGEMENT, NETWORKING, RESOURCE MOBILIZATION, AND MANAGEMENT; NETWORKING LEADERS; PROVIDING SEED CAPITAL FOR YOUTH-LED ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTIVITIES?

		Frequency	Percent
Level of agreement	Strongly disagree	4	5.1
	Disagree	34	43.6
	Neutral	4	5.1
	Agree	16	20.5
	Strongly Agree	20	25.6
	Total	78	100.0

Women's Civic Engagement and Participation

Table 11: Level of Women's civic engagement and Participation

A large majority (65%) agreed that formal and non-formal activities promote women's civic engagement in the community. Women actively participate in volunteerism activities; advocacy

TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS? THERE ARE FORMAL AND NON-FORMAL ACTIVITIES THAT PROMOTE THE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT OF WOMEN IN YOUR COMMUNITY? EXAMPLE: VOLUNTEERISM ACTIVITIES, ADVOCACY WORKS ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS ISSUES, ETC.)

		Frequency	Percent
Level of agreement	Strongly disagree	0	0
	Disagree	12	15.4
	Neutral	15	19.2
	Agree	48	61.5
	Strongly Agree	3	3.8
	Total	78	100.0

works on women's rights issues. But there are differences when we combine this finding with the qualitative findings. Further triangulations are required. During FGD and KII interviews, a large majority replied that there is a low level of women's civic engagement where their role is highly restricted to household chores and childbearing.

Table 12: Addressing gender inequality.

According to the above table, more than half (59%) disagree that the local level government is not closest to citizens, and local authorities are not playing a vital role in addressing gender

TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS? AS THE LOCAL LEVEL GOVERNMENT IS CLOSEST TO CITIZENS, LOCAL AUTHORITIES PLAY A VITAL ROLE IN ADDRESSING GENDER INEQUALITY AND IN BUILDING THE CAPACITIES OF WOMEN BY INVOLVING THEM IN LOCAL DECISION-MAKING, PLANNING, AND MANAGEMENT

Level of agreement		Frequency	Percent
	Strongly disagree	7	9.0
	Disagree	32	41.0
	Neutral	17	21.8
	Agree	9	11.5
	Strongly Agree	13	16.7
	Total	78	100.0

inequality via building the capacities of women by involving them in local decision making, planning, and management. Only a quarter (28.2%) of the respondents agreed that there are initiatives to empower women by involving them in local decision-making, planning, and management. Hence, this finding is in line with the qualitative finding that women are not taking part in decision-making at home and their community.